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INTRODUCTION 
It is axiomatic that corporate directors face a myriad of difficult and 
complex decisions that they must make consistently with the fiduciary 
duties they owe to the corporation.  Delaware courts have developed a 
variety of tests to monitor whether directors have remained true to these 
duties:  the business judgment rule, the enhanced business judgment rule, 
Revlon, entire fairness, Blasius, and Schnell.  Courts and scholars will 
reflexively repeat that under the business judgment rule, judges defer to the 
directors’ decision when it was made in compliance with their fiduciary 
duties.  In contrast, the conventional wisdom is that the other five tests—
the enhanced business judgment rule, Revlon, entire fairness, Blasius, and 
Schnell (hereinafter the “five tests”)—require substantial judicial 
involvement and scrutiny.  Such involvement makes sense, since the 
applicability of each test necessarily first required a court to conclude that 
the business judgment rule was inapplicable. 
This Article contends that the conventional wisdom about the five 
tests is an overstatement:  While courts state openly that they defer to the 
directors’ judgment under the business judgment rule, similar deference, 
repackaged, occurs with three of the other five tests as well.  In addition, 
Delaware courts often utilize three external monitors that offer a high 
probability of fairness—independent directors, disinterested shareholder 
approval, and the market—to avoid judicial review.  Moreover, this Article 
contends that courts have created high hurdles for plaintiffs to qualify for 
the remaining two tests, so that few cases ever need be decided solely by 
judicial review.  Thus far, scholars have paid significant attention to when 
courts will apply each of these tests
1
 but have devoted scant attention to the 
premises underlying these tests.  Transactional and litigation lawyers who 
understand what lurks beneath the five tests will thus be better able to plan 
for a successful litigation outcome. 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the business judgment rule and 
 
*Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.  A.B., Vassar 
College, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1975.  The research for this Article was supported by 
research funds from the Washington College of Law.  The author is indebted to the 
invaluable research assistance of Alexander Lutch, J.D. 2012, Washington College of Law, 
and Oded Cedar, J.D. 2012, Washington College of Law. 
       1.   See, e.g., Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors 
and Officers in Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1994) (analyzing when the enhanced 
business judgment test will apply); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers 
Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990) (discussing the role of the Revlon test and its 
triggers in the context of Delaware law); David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference 
with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 927 (2001) (surveying when courts will apply the Blasius test). 
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the five tests.  Part II discusses Delaware cases decided under each of the 
five tests, showing that while courts overtly state that they review directors’ 
decisions in all five tests, courts instead typically employ a non-judicial 
monitor to avoid such a review in the Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness 
tests.  Although no monitor is available for either the Schnell or Blasius 
tests, courts have made it quite difficult to invoke either of these tests so 
that the instances of judicial review under these tests are almost 
nonexistent.  Part III discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the external 
monitors; readers can therefore evaluate whether corporate case law has 
been improved by courts largely bypassing judicial review in favor of these 
monitors.  Part IV discusses a few notable exceptions to this pattern of 
deference and explains how these decisions would have been otherwise 
decided using one or more non-judicial monitors. 
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SIX TESTS 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
Perhaps the most often quoted description of the business judgment 
rule is found in Aronson v. Lewis:  The rule is “a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.”
2
  Plaintiffs must dislodge that 
presumption by producing sufficient evidence
3
 that directors violated their 
duty of care or loyalty.
4
  In Delaware, directors satisfy their duty of care if 
they are not grossly negligent,
5
 and their duty of loyalty requires them to be 
both independent
6
 and disinterested
7
 (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
 
 2.  473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 
(Del. Ch. 1971)).  Unlike the standards contained in the five tests, the business judgment 
rule is not a standard of review.  Instead, “it is an expression of a policy of non-review of a 
board of directors’ decision when a judge has already performed the crucial task of 
determining that certain conditions exist.”  William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 
1297 (2000). 
 3.  See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (stating that it is the plaintiff’s 
burden under the business judgment rule to rebut the presumption that directors complied 
with their fiduciary duties in making a decision); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 
669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he presumption of the business judgment rule attaches ab 
initio and to survive a [motion to dismiss], a plaintiff must allege well-pleaded facts to 
overcome the presumption.”). 
 4.  Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996) (“Only by demonstrating that 
the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the presumption of the business judgment rule 
be rebutted.”); State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 42, at *11-12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000) (reasoning that unless the presumption of the 
business judgment rule is sufficiently rebutted by the plaintiff creating a “reasonable doubt 
about self-interest or independence, the Court must defer to the discretion of the board”); 
see also STEPHEN A. RADIN, 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 53-55 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting several Delaware decisions that 
explain the burden for a shareholder plaintiff). 
 5.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (identifying “gross negligence” as 
the level of conduct that would “giv[e] rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care”); 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (establishing gross negligence as the 
standard by which boards are liable for violating their duty of care). 
 6.  Aronson v. Lewis defines independence:  “Independence means that a director’s 
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than 
extraneous considerations or influences.”  473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).  Delaware courts 
have further clarified that in order for a director to be classified as not independent, any 
benefit the director gets from a transaction must be both different from the benefit received 
by similarly-situated shareholders and material to that director.  Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 
1120, 1127 (Del. 2010) (holding that if directors receive identical benefits to similarly-
situated shareholders, those directors lack independence); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 
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“independent”) and to have acted in good faith.
8
  By stating that they will 
afford heightened deference to decisions made by outside, independent 
directors,
9
 Delaware courts have incentivized corporations to design their 
boards with a majority of independent directors or to have interested 
directors recuse themselves so that decisions are made by a majority of 
independent directors.
10
 
Delaware courts have given several different rationales for the 
business judgment rule.  One is that “discretion granted directors and 
managers allows them to maximize shareholder value in the long term by 
taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally 
 
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995) (holding that a benefit given to a director must be 
material); In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., No. 20269, slip op. at 22 (Del. Ch. 
May 4, 2005) (holding, also, that a benefit received by a director must be material); see also 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (explaining that a plaintiff can show a 
lack of independence where directors are so “under [the influence of another] that their 
discretion would be sterilized”); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting 
that courts apply a subjective “actual person” standard when assessing interestedness and 
independence). 
 7.  To be considered disinterested, directors “can neither appear on both sides of a 
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-
dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders 
generally.”  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Orman, 794 A.2d at 23 (noting that the 
material interest required for a director to be considered interested is judged in relation to 
the director’s economic circumstances). 
 8.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that good faith is a 
subset of the duty of loyalty); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 
64, 67 (Del. 2006) (defining good faith by giving two, non-exclusive definitions of bad 
faith:  (i) subjective bad faith, where the fiduciary actually intends to harm the corporation, 
and (ii) where a fiduciary acts in conscious disregard of his duties or acts intentionally to 
violate the law). 
 9.  See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988) (“Approval of a transaction 
by a majority of independent, disinterested directors almost always bolsters a presumption 
that the business judgment rule attaches to transactions approved by a board of directors that 
are later attacked on grounds of lack of due care.”); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 
1986) (reasoning that since ten of the thirteen directors were outside directors, and they 
received outside financial and legal advice, their actions constituted a “prima facie showing 
of good faith and reasonable investigation”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 
A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988) (emphasizing the deference accorded to independent directors in 
applying the business judgment rule to an independent committee’s merger negotiations). 
 10.  See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) 
(noting that because the two interested directors recused themselves from participating in 
the board meetings, thereby leaving the independent directors in the majority, “proof that 
the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced”).  
Sometimes, a board will create a committee consisting solely of independent directors to 
make decisions where a majority of the board is not independent.  See, e.g., infra note 273 
and accompanying text (discussing board’s creation of an independent committee in Kahn v. 
Lynch). 
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liable if the company experiences losses,”
11
 or if a better deal emerges in 
the future.
12
  Second, the rule encourages qualified individuals to become 
directors, as the rule minimizes the chance of personal liability.
13
  The third 
rationale is that courts are ill-equipped to make business judgments.
14
  
Judges are appointed or elected to the bench for a variety of reasons, but 
business judgment and expertise need not be prominent criteria for 
someone’s ascension to the bench.  Instead, shareholders elect directors to 
make business judgments on behalf of the corporation, presumably because 
candidates for this position have business judgment and expertise.
15
  
Finally, the business judgment rule ensures that directors, not shareholders, 
manage the corporation; if directors could easily be held liable, 
shareholders might frequently ask for judicial review and thereby intrude 
on the board’s decision-making.
16
  Several of these rationales are embodied 
in the following explanation by the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
 
 11.  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009); 
see also id. at 131 (“[I]t is tempting in a case with such staggering losses for one to think 
that they could have made the ‘right’ decision if they had been in the directors’ position.  
This temptation, however, is one of the reasons for the presumption against an objective 
review of business decisions by judges, a presumption that is no less applicable when the 
losses to the Company are large.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1055 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that the business judgment rule acknowledges that directors will 
not take appropriate risks and consequently maximize returns for shareholders if they are 
concerned about personal liability from derivative actions). 
 12.   In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(discussing when directors can be liable for their decisions and noting that “[t]ime-bound 
mortals cannot foresee the future”). 
 13.  See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2006) (expressing 
concern that the business judgment rule’s “utility in encouraging risk-taking and board 
service [not] be undermined”); see also RADIN, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that the business 
judgment rule encourages more people to become directors). 
 14.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“Because courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc substantive 
review of business decisions,” the business judgment rule allows courts to avoid such 
review); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(commenting on the need for the business judgment rule in order to avoid “substantive 
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries”). 
 15.  In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(“Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information 
and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts . . . courts have long been reluctant to 
second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith.”). 
 16.  Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. L. 461, 470 
(1992) (explaining that the business judgment rule is intended to protect the authority of the 
board); Michel P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative 
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. L. 503, 522 
(1989) (“The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to 
decide.  If stockholders are given too easy access to courts, the effect is to transfer 
decisionmaking power from the board to the stockholders . . . .”). 
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The business judgment rule serves to protect and promote the 
role of the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.  
Because courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc substantive 
review of business decisions, the business judgment rule 
“operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably 
on the business and affairs of a corporation.”
17
 
Therefore, unless the plaintiff can raise sufficient doubt that the rule’s 
presumption is inaccurate because a board was disloyal or not sufficiently 
careful, the rule “prevents a judge or jury from second guessing director 
decisions.”
18
  As a result, the business judgment rule overwhelmingly 
restricts plaintiffs and courts to claims that the process by which the board 
made its decision was inconsistent with the board’s fiduciary duties.  With 
rare exceptions, the rule precludes both plaintiffs and courts from attacking 
the board’s decision itself.
19
 
The business judgment rule is powerful not only because it requires 
the court to defer to the board’s decision, but also because of the breadth of 
the rule’s applicability.  It is standard for courts to apply the business 
judgment rule to operational issues.  For example, in In re Walt Disney Co. 
 
 17.  Disney, 907 A.2d at 746 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 
360 (Del. 1993)); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812 (“Absent an abuse of 
discretion, [the board’s] judgment will be respected by the courts.”); Reading Co. v. Trailer 
Train Co., C.A. No. 7422, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1984) (“The business judgment 
rule allows for the possibility that other people might disagree with a board’s decision . . . .  
In the context of our corporate business world, courts should be loathe to interfere with the 
internal management of corporations or to interfere with their business decisions unless 
statutory or case law indicates they have overstepped their bounds.”). 
 18.  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 19.  There are a few Delaware cases that state that there is a sliver of room to attack the 
board’s decision under the business judgment rule.  See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 
695, 705-06 (Del. 2009) (explaining that under the business judgment rule, a court will not 
second-guess a board’s decision unless it cannot find any rational basis for the decision); 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that the board’s 
decision under the business judgment rule will stand unless it “can[not] be attributed to any 
rational business purpose.”); accord Parnes v. Bally, 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); see 
also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (explaining that “[i]rrationality is the 
outer limit of the business judgment rule” and “may tend to show that [a] decision is not 
made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule”) (citation 
omitted); Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique 
in Light of the Financial Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010/2011) (reasoning that 
although plaintiffs can theoretically challenge the substance of the decision, they are limited 
to proving that the directors committed waste, a test “so difficult to satisfy that many 
commentators describe it as a judicial refusal to evaluate the substantive merits of a board’s 
decision at all”); Allen et al., supra note 2, at 1298 (noting that if the conditions of the 
business judgment rule are satisfied, “it is as a practical matter impossible that the resulting 
decision can be found irrational”). 
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Derivative Litigation,
20
 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business 
judgment rule applied to a board’s compensation decisions surrounding the 
hiring of the corporation’s president.
21
  Despite a suit by Disney 
shareholders claiming that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by 
agreeing to the president’s compensation package and highly lucrative 
severance package, the court applied the business judgment rule to the 
directors’ decisions.  Similarly, in Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, 
Inc.,
22
 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s finding 
that the board’s decision to issue additional stock was covered by the 
business judgment rule despite claims that the issuance was designed to 
dilute the power of certain shareholders.
23
 
Courts, however, have not limited the business judgment rule only to 
operational issues; courts have also applied the rule to organic changes.  
For example, in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.,
24
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court applied the business judgment rule to the Time board’s 
original decision to enter into a merger agreement with Warner Brothers.  
In reviewing the shareholders’ challenge to the board’s conduct,
25
 the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated: 
We begin by noting, as did the Chancellor, that our decision does 
not require us to pass on the wisdom of the board’s decision to 
enter into the original Time-Warner agreement.  That is not a 
court’s task.  Our task is simply to review the record to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Chancellor’s 
conclusion that the initial Time-Warner agreement was the 
product of a proper exercise of business judgment . . . .  [T]he 
Time board’s decision . . . was entitled to the protection of the 
business judgment rule.
26
 
In addition to applying the business judgment rule both to operational 
 
 20.  906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 21.  Id. at 58. 
 22.  906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006). 
 23.  Id. at 121–22. 
 24.  571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); accord Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 
1985) (applying the business judgment rule to board’s decision to enter into a third-party 
merger agreement, but finding that the board violated the rule); Van de Walle v. Unimation, 
Inc., No. 7046, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at *31 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (holding that the 
merger should be reviewed under the business judgment rule because “in substance and in 
form the merger was a bona fide arm’s-length transaction negotiated with a third party”). 
 25.  While the court made clear that the business judgment rule governed the Time 
board’s initial merger decision, 571 A.2d at 1142, most of the case involved a challenge to 
the board’s conduct subsequent to the board’s initial decision, after Paramount Corporation 
offered Time shareholders a substantially better deal than they would receive in the 
proposed Time-Warner merger.  See id. at 1149-55. 
 26.  Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted). 
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issues as well as to organic changes, Delaware courts have held that the 
rule can govern even particularly sensitive issues.  One example involved 
board conduct that had the effect of overturning the results of the 
shareholders’ vote on the election of directors.  Although Delaware courts 
have made clear that they will zealously safeguard shareholder voting 
rights against board attempts to eviscerate those rights,
27
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court in City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System v. 
Alexis Technologies, Inc.
28
 held, in an en banc decision, that the business 
judgment rule would apply to the board’s decision to enact a policy that 
instituted majority voting for the election of directors, but gave the board 
the power to refuse the resignation of any candidate who failed to garner 
the requisite number of votes.
29
  The board then exercised that self-
empowered discretion to reject the resignation of the candidates who did 
not garner majority support from the shareholders.
30
  Although the plaintiff 
charged that a standard higher than the business judgment rule should 
apply, either because the case involved shareholder voting rights or because 
the allegedly independent directors were merely protecting their 
colleagues,
31
 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment 
rule was the proper governing standard of review.
32
 
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court has given the business judgment 
rule a wide reach.  Delaware courts have applied the business judgment 
rule to monitor transactions spanning from routine to organic changes, as 
well as decisions that are both difficult and politically charged.  The wide 
applicability of the business judgment rule thereby generates a plethora of 
decisions in which the court will defer to the directors’ business judgment 
 
 27.  See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (striking down 
defensive measure that increased the size of the target’s board because the primary purpose 
of this action was to impede the shareholder vote); Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 
A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (invalidating defensive measure of expanding board size because 
of its effect of impeding shareholder vote despite finding that directors acted in good faith); 
see infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (describing courts’ heightened scrutiny under 
the Blasius test as a result of concern for shareholder voting rights). 
 28.  1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (en banc). 
 29.  Specifically, the board enacted a “plurality-plus policy” that (i) required incumbent 
board candidates up for re-election to submit a resignation conditioned upon failing to 
receive majority support, (ii) required candidates to be elected by majority, rather than a 
plurality, of votes, and (iii) gave the board discretionary power to reject or accept 
resignations tendered by incumbent directors who failed to receive the requisite support.  Id. 
at 283. 
 30.  Id. at 285–86. 
 31.  Id. at 286. 
 32.  Id. at 291.  While acknowledging that the board’s decision to reject the proffered 
resignations had the effect of overriding the shareholder vote, id., the court held that future 
shareholders could demand to inspect the corporate books and records to investigate the 
suitability of directors to continue in office.  Id. at 289. 
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as long as plaintiffs are unable to surmount the significant burden of a 
prima facie showing that the board breached its fiduciary duties in the 
process of making the decision under review.  One of the following five 
tests will apply only if plaintiff has made such a showing
33
 or if the court 
believes that the board has transcended its powers.
34
 
 
B. The Enhanced Business Judgment Rule 
As noted above, the business judgment rule does not apply if the board 
is not disinterested and independent.
35
  Thus, once the Delaware Supreme 
Court accepted target shareholders’ claims that hostile tender offers create 
inherent conflicts for target directors,
36
 the court could not apply the 
business judgment rule to monitor directors’ responses to such offers.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
37
 
however, bypassed its traditional conflict monitor, the entire fairness test,
38
 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) (stating that entire 
fairness “becomes an issue only if the presumption of the business judgment rule is 
defeated”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 
1986) (“No such defensive measure can be sustained when it represents a breach of the 
directors’ fundamental duty of care . . . .  In that context the board’s action is not entitled to 
the deference accorded it by the business judgment rule.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may 
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold 
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”). 
 34.  Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), Mentor Graphics 
Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), and Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) are all cases where at least part of the 
holding was that the board exceeded its powers.  See infra notes 78, 236 and accompanying 
text. 
 35.  See supra notes 4–8. 
 36.  See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (conceding that that there was “the omnipresent 
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its shareholders”); see also Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate 
Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 324–25 (1987) 
(arguing that target directors may be motivated to reject an offer because of fear of losing 
their job and the accompanying power, prestige, and financial rewards). 
 37.  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 38.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (noting that if a plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule 
presumption, the burden shifts to the directors to show entire fairness); Kahn v. Roberts, 
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995) (explaining that, in an 
interested director transaction, “courts generally will bypass the business judgment rule and 
conduct an entire fairness analysis on the challenged transaction”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & 
JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS § 4.19B at 4-172 (2011 supp.) (“If the business judgment rule’s 
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and instead created a new standard, which it named the “enhanced business 
judgment rule,” to monitor decisions by target directors to enact defensive 
tactics when faced with a hostile takeover.
39
  Characterizing this new test as 
an intermediate standard of review,
40
 the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained: 
[T]he omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in 
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial 
examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.
41
 
Unlike the business judgment rule, which places the initial burden of 
proof on plaintiffs, this newly-created test requires the target board to bear 
the burden of showing first, that it acted with “good faith and reasonable 
investigation” by demonstrating that it had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness,
42
 
and second, that the defensive measure it chose was “reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed.”
43
  This second step must be neither coercive nor 
preclusive,
44
 and the shareholders’ option to vote their directors out of 
office must remain viable.
45
  The Unocal test purports to lack the deference 
to the directors’ judgment embodied in the business judgment rule because 
Unocal places the burden of proof on the board to show that it both 
 
presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors to show the ‘entire 
fairness’ of the transaction.”). 
 39.  See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 38, § 4.20[A] at 4-186 (“Unocal applies in 
change-of-control contexts when a board takes some action that alters, manages, or deters 
the threatened change of control.”). 
 40.  Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(noting in the Revlon context that enhanced business judgment is an “intermediate level of 
judicial review”). 
 41.  Unocal at 954 (emphasis added). 
 42.  Id. at 955. 
 43.  Id.  If the board meets the Unocal test, the burden switches to the plaintiff to show 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors’ decisions were primarily based on 
perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, 
overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed.”  Id. at 958. 
 44.  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (describing 
measures that are either coercive or preclusive as draconian). 
 45.  See id. at 1388-89 (requiring proxy contest to remain viable in order for defensive 
tactic to avoid being preclusive); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959 (“If the stockholders are 
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate 
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. 
v. Riggio, C.A. No. 5465-VCS, slip op. at 45 n. 182 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2010) (explaining 
that the defensive tactic must leave an insurgent with a “fair chance for victory,” rather than 
a “slight possibility of victory” in order for the defensive tactic to avoid being classified as 
preclusive). 
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conducted a reasonable process and chose a defensive tactic that is not 
preclusive, coercive or unreasonable.  Thus, there is “judicial examination 
at the threshold” of the board’s process as well as its decision, thereby 
providing both a subjective and an objective review of the defensive 
tactic.
46
 
 
C. Revlon 
Similarly, Delaware courts have chosen to apply enhanced business 
judgment
47
 when a corporation is in the “Revlon mode,” a designation the 
court created in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
48
  In 
Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that if the corporation is in the 
Revlon mode, the board’s duty changes from the preservation of the 
corporation to the “maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholders’ benefit.”
49
  Since the board must focus solely on maximizing 
value for its shareholders, it may no longer consider the interests of 
“other . . . constituencies.”
50
  Moreover, because “[m]arket forces must be 
allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders the best price 
available for their equity,”
51
 a board’s use of covenants that interfere with 
the market will be suspect.
52
 
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the Revlon board’s 
 
 46.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 
830 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Enhanced scrutiny has both subjective and objective components.”); 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2011) (stating 
that the Unocal test requires an examination of both the process used to identify the threat 
and the reasonableness of the resulting decision); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that 
directors could use a rights plan improperly, even when acting subjectively in good faith, 
Unocal and its progeny require that this Court also review the use of a rights plan 
objectively.”); see also Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in 
Conflict Transactions on Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 967, 973–74 (2011) (stating that enhanced scrutiny has subjective and objective 
components). 
 47.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) (noting 
that courts will apply enhanced scrutiny when a corporation is in the Revlon mode). 
 48.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 49.  Id. at 182; see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (“In the sale of 
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction 
offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise 
their fiduciary duties to further that end.”). 
 50.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
 51.  Id. at 184. 
 52.  Id. at 183-84. 
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decision to grant a lock-up, cancellation fee, and a no-shop provision to its 
white knight in the face of a competing bidder because these covenants 
hindered, rather than promoted, competitive bidding for the target.
53
  The 
Delaware Supreme Court warned future boards that although covenants are 
not illegal when a corporation is in the Revlon mode,
54
 covenants are highly 
disfavored because they normally deter, rather than spur, competitive 
bidding.
55
  While reserving the option to add additional categories to its list 
of Revlon “triggers,”
56
 only a few fact patterns currently trigger Revlon 
review.
57
 
 
 53.  Id. at 184.  A lock-up is an option to buy shares or assets of the target company.  
Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target 
Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 341 n.87 (1987).  A cancellation fee provides liquidated 
damages to the bidder in the event the acquisition fails to close.  Id. at 341 n.88.  A no-shop 
provision prevents the target from seeking or negotiating with another bidder.  Id. at 341 
n.89.  A “white knight” is a friendly acquirer sought by the target company in response to a 
hostile bidder’s tender offer.  Id. at 341 n.90. 
 54.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183. 
 55.  Id.; see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d at 49 (Del. 1994) (holding that a no-shop 
provision impermissibly interfered with the directors’ ability to negotiate with another 
known bidder when the corporation was in the Revlon mode); Rand v. W. Airlines, Inc., 
C.A. No. 8632, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (warning that 
the only auction-ending devices that are permissible when the corporation is in a Revlon 
mode are those that “confer a substantial benefit upon the stockholders”). 
 56.  In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP 2011 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 79, at *45 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has determined 
that a board might find itself faced with [a Revlon] duty in at least three scenarios . . . .”). 
 57.  See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (listing 
the following transactions that will put the corporation in a Revlon mode:  “(1) when a 
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business 
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company; (2) where, in response to a 
bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction 
involving the break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in a 
sale or change of control”) (quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 
1290 (Del. 1994)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Since the Delaware 
Supreme Court has yet to draw a clear line for when Revlon review would apply to a mixed 
cash and stock transaction, Delaware courts are working their way through these fact 
patterns.  See id. at 70-71 (holding that thirty-three percent cash did not trigger Revlon 
duties); In re Smurfit-Stone, 2011 Del Ch. LEXIS 79, at *60 (holding that a merger in 
which target shareholders would receive half cash, half stock, and ownership of forty-five 
percent of the combined company, is in in a Revlon mode); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 
A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (suggesting that a merger that provided sixty-two percent of the 
consideration to target shareholders in cash would be in a Revlon mode).  Cf. In re Synthes, 
Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1047-48 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that no change of 
control occurred so as to trip Revlon duties where sixty-five percent of the purchase price 
was paid with the purchaser’s publicly-traded stock, making it impossible for the purchaser 
to have a controlling shareholder); In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 361-VCN, 
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Delaware courts occasionally bristle, however, at the inference that 
there are special Revlon duties, as they view the directors’ obligations in 
Revlon simply as an extension of their fundamental fiduciary duties.
58
  
Thus, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained that, in a Revlon 
transaction, the court: 
adopts an intermediate level of judicial review which recognizes 
the broad power of the board to make decisions in the process of 
negotiating and recommending a “sale of control” transaction, so 
long as the board is informed, motivated by good faith desire to 
achieve the best available transaction, and proceeds 
“reasonably[.]”
59
 
Since courts will review a board’s compliance with its Revlon duties under 
the enhanced business judgment rule, directors bear the burden of proving 
their compliance with their required duties.
60
  As such, courts purport not to 
defer to the board’s judgment under Revlon. 
 
D. Entire Fairness 
As noted above,
61
 since the business judgment rule requires directors 
to be disinterested, a finding of self-interest makes the business judgment 
rule inapplicable.  In situations involving a conflict of interest, courts 
 
3835-VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5-7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (dismissing shareholder 
challenge to merger and finding transaction adequate that offered shareholders thirty-six 
percent cash at the time of the merger, and forty-four percent cash at the closing of the 
merger, but declining to rule squarely on whether the corporation was in a Revlon mode). 
 58.  Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994) 
(describing “Revlon duties” as “colloquial[]” and “inappropriate[]”); Barkan v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (stating that Revlon duties mean simply that 
“directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty”). 
 59.  Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 60.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (“[I]n the review of a transaction involving a sale of a company, the 
directors have the burden of establishing that the price offered was the highest value 
reasonably available under the circumstances.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (noting that when a court applies enhanced business 
judgment, the board bears the burden of proof); see also supra text accompanying notes 42–
43 (explaining that the burden of proof is on the board of directors). 
 61.  See supra notes 4, 6–8 and accompanying text (defining independence and its 
relationship to the duty of loyalty); see also Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (“The burden falls upon the proponent of a claim to rebut the 
presumption [of the business judgment rule] by introducing evidence either of director self-
interest, if not self-dealing, or that the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise 
due care.”). 
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typically utilize the entire fairness test.
62
  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
63
 a case 
involving a controlling-shareholder cash-out merger, provides, perhaps, the 
most often cited description of the entire fairness test.  In Weinberger, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that since the controlling shareholder 
controlled both sides of the merger, the target corporation was required to 
prove the entire fairness of the transaction.
64
  The court explained that its 
examination would be thorough, encompassing a review of every feature of 
the board’s conduct to determine whether it had engaged in fair dealing and 
had offered a fair price,
65
 but warned that “[a]ll aspects of the issue must be 
examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”
66
  Thus, 
Weinberger put defendants on notice that they bear the burden of proving 
any factor that the court considers probative of the transaction’s fairness.
67
 
Following Weinberger, Delaware courts have repeatedly warned that 
the entire fairness test requires a court to conduct a searching and pervasive 
inquiry.
68
  In fact, given the difficulty of the test, some judges consider the 
decision to apply the entire fairness test to be almost outcome 
determinative.
69
  As such, the entire fairness test is the epitome of judicial 
 
 62.  See supra note 38 (establishing that the entire fairness test is the usual test applied 
when directors are not disinterested). 
 63.  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 64.  Id. at 710. 
 65.  The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger defined fair dealing as involving 
“questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were 
obtained,” and fair price “relates to the economic and financial considerations” of the 
transaction.  Id. at 711. 
 66.  Id.; Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1020 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[A] 
Delaware Court ‘determines entire fairness based on all aspects of the entire transaction.’”) 
(quoting Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 746 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 
 67.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness is 
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the 
burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the 
courts.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(noting the “careful scrutiny” required under entire fairness review); Linton v. Everett, No. 
15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (holding that issuance by 
directors of shares to themselves did not satisfy the “rigorous standard” of entire fairness); 
see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 4-172, § 4.19[B][A] (Supp. 2012) (describing 
the “heavy burden” of showing entire fairness); RADIN, supra note 4, at 65 (noting that the 
“fairness requirement entails ‘exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is 
entirely fair to the stockholders’”) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network 
Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994)). 
 69.  Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Entire 
fairness is Delaware’s most onerous standard.”); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1371 (Del. 1995) (noting that the standard of review under which directors’ actions 
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review. 
 
E. Blasius 
Unlike the previous three tests, the Blasius test—created in Blasius 
Industries v. Atlas Corporation
70
 and affirmed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in MM Cos. v. Liquid Auto
71
—is tripped by a board’s improper 
purpose.  This doctrine states that if the plaintiff establishes that the board 
acted for the primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of the shareholder 
vote for the election of directors, the board must demonstrate a compelling 
justification for its actions.
72
  In Blasius, the board attempted to thwart the 
shareholder vote by expanding the number of directors, which had the 
effect of preventing insurgents from gaining control of the board.
73
  
Although finding that the board had acted with good faith and care, and 
that the directors had good cause to be concerned about the insurgent’s plan 
to take over the corporation, the Court of Chancery nevertheless found that 
the board had acted primarily to thwart the exercise of the shareholder 
vote.
74
  Since the board could offer no compelling purpose for its actions, 
the court held that the directors had committed an “unintended violation of 
the duty of loyalty” and had acted outside the scope of their authority.
75
 
 
are evaluated is generally outcome determinative given the strength of the business 
judgment rule presumption and the scrutiny employed under the entire fairness standard); 
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(“Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful 
and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard 
of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.”).  
There are, of course, some cases in which defendants have proven the entire fairness of their 
decision.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (holding that the board 
met its burden of proving its decision to have corporation repurchase stock of employee-
shareholders, but not of non-employee shareholders, to be entirely fair). 
 70.  564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 71.  813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003). 
 72.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661–62; see also, In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 
C.A. No. 20269, slip op. at 32 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005), aff’d, 897 A.2d 162 (Del. 2006) 
(holding that the plaintiff has two burdens under Blasius:  showing the board’s primary 
purpose and the thwarting of the franchise); Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 352 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 884 A.2d 512 (Del. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff must show both elements 
under Blasius). 
 73.  564 A.2d at 657–58.  Blasius sought to enjoin the Atlas board’s decision to add two 
new directors to its seven-member board.  Id. at 652.  Blasius claimed that the Atlas board 
expanded its membership in order to thwart Blasius’ efforts to gain control of the board.  Id. 
at 657–58. 
 74.  Id. at 663. 
 75.  Id. (“A majority of the shareholders . . . could view the matter differently than did 
the board.  If they do, or did, they are entitled to . . . advance that view.  They are also 
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The Court of Chancery’s analysis in Blasius exposes the 
uncompromising nature of the compelling purpose requirement.  The court 
first considered whether such board conduct should be per se illegal.
76
  
Instead, the Delaware Chancery Court settled for a slightly lesser standard 
and held that the board must demonstrate a compelling reason for its 
actions.  The mere fact that the court considered making such board 
conduct per se illegal, however, highlights the skepticism with which the 
court will consider a board’s proffered reason for its actions.  Moreover, 
the court held that the board’s good faith and due care are irrelevant in the 
analysis of whether they had a compelling justification for their conduct.
77
 
Similarly, the court’s logic for creating the Blasius test provides 
further evidence that judicial review under this test will be demanding.  The 
court held that the board should not be able to monitor whom the 
shareholders elect to the board as the power to elect directors is outside of 
the province of the board’s power.
78
  Moreover, the court reasoned that the 
integrity of the shareholder vote merited special consideration because that 
vote legitimizes director control over corporate power.
79
  Both of these 
reasons provide justification for courts to scrutinize the board’s behavior 
carefully in order to keep the board from encroaching on the shareholders’ 
domain. 
The trigger for applying the Blasius doctrine explains why courts will 
not defer to directors under this test:  Any board that acts primarily to 
thwart the vote of its shareholders is itself acting outside the scope of its 
powers.  Such claims of board overreaching would not permit courts, by 
definition, to defer to the board.  Moreover, only courts can evaluate 
whether a board has offered a compelling justification for its conduct. 
 
F. Schnell 
The final test, the Schnell doctrine, is the antithesis of the business 
judgment rule because the doctrine permits courts to invalidate a board’s 
decision without first faulting the board’s decision-making.  In Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
80
 corporate directors moved the date and 
 
entitled . . . to restrain . . . the board, from acting for the principal purpose of thwarting that 
action.”). 
 76.  Id. at 662. 
 77.  Id. at 660–61; see also In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that under Blasius, a board’s good faith is irrelevant). 
 78.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
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location of the corporation’s annual meeting in an effort to thwart insurgent 
shareholders’ proxy fight.
81
  Although the Delaware Chancery Court upheld 
the board’s conduct as being in full compliance with the statute and the 
corporation’s charter,
82
 the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, articulating 
what became known as the “Schnell doctrine”:  “[I]nequitable action does 
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”
83
  The 
Delaware Supreme Court found the board’s conduct was inequitable 
because the directors purposefully manipulated the electoral machinery so 
as to entrench themselves in power.
84
  As such, the court held that the 
board’s conduct was per se illegal.  Most,
85
 but not all,
86
 cases where the 
court has applied this doctrine have involved board attempts to frustrate the 
shareholder vote. 
Thus, applicability of the Schnell doctrine requires a court to conclude 
that although the board acted legally, its decision was inequitable.  Both 
components of this test make it impossible for a judge to defer to the board:  
Only a judge can determine if a board has acted legally, and only a judge 
can exercise a court’s equitable powers to invalidate inequitable conduct. 
 
G. Summary 
In sum, Delaware courts have stated that judicial deference is 
warranted only under the business judgment rule and have also created the 
impression that the other five tests require extensive judicial review.  The 
courts have created this impression by placing the burden on the board to 
 
 81.  Chris-Craft’s directors moved the meeting date from January 11, 1972, to 
December 8, 1971, thereby giving the insurgents less time to prepare and solicit proxies, and 
moved the location of the meeting to Cortland, New York in hopes that this location would 
be inconvenient and thus would deter shareholders from attending the meeting.  Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 430, 432–34 (Del. Ch. 1971), rev’d, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 
1971). 
 82.  Id. at 437. 
 83.  Id. at 439. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Since Schnell was decided, only thirteen other cases have been decided using this 
doctrine.  Of these thirteen cases, eleven relate to a voting issue.  See infra note 191 (listing 
all 13 cases). 
 86.  The two cases that did not relate to shareholder voting were Hollinger Int’l v. 
Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080–81 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC 
Industries, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) to show that Schnell is applicable to bylaw 
amendments and then striking down bylaw amendments as inequitable) and Seagraves v. 
Urstadt Property Co., C.A. No. 10307, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 1989) 
(refusing to dismiss a complaint regarding delisting of shares and nonpayment of dividends 
because of the potential for equitable relief under Schnell). 
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prove to the court’s satisfaction the respective requirements of the Unocal, 
Revlon, and entire fairness tests.  Similarly, only courts can determine if 
boards trigger and ultimately pass the requirements of Blasius and Schnell.  
As a result, Delaware courts have implied that they often review board 
decisions.  As Part II of this Article delineates, however, there is more 
lurking behind these five tests than is superficially apparent. 
 
II. PEELING BACK THE TESTS 
A. Enhanced Business Judgment: Unocal 
Pursuant to the enhanced business judgment test, the board loses its 
presumption of propriety and instead bears the burden of convincing the 
court that the directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duties both in 
identifying and in their reaction to their perceived threat to corporate 
policy.  As noted above,
87
 the court professes to examine both the board’s 
process and its decision under this enhanced test.  Underneath this veneer 
of judicial review, however, is convincing evidence that Delaware courts, 
in reality, heavily defer to the decision of the target directors. 
The most obvious evidence that Delaware courts normally defer to the 
board under the enhanced business judgment rule is that the Delaware 
Supreme Court explicitly said that it would be particularly inclined to defer 
to the directors’ decision to employ defensive tactics if a majority of 
independent directors made the decision.
88
  The Court of Chancery recently 
explained the logic of diluting the board’s burden if the decision was made 
by a majority of independent directors: 
Under Unocal, where the defensive actions were taken by “a 
 
 87.  See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
 88.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citations 
omitted) (“In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had reasonable 
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of 
another person’s stock ownership.  However, they satisfy that burden ‘by showing good 
faith and reasonable investigation . . . .’  Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as 
here, by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors 
who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”); see also Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (“The evidence supporting 
this finding is materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of Time’s sixteen board members 
were outside independent directors.”); cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177, n.3 (rejecting the idea of 
deferring to the board because a majority of directors lacked independence); Grand Metro., 
PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“If a majority of the board 
consisted of ‘outside, independent directors,’ their ‘proof’ as to the Unocal requirements . . . 
is ‘materially enhanced.’”); see infra note 113. 
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majority of outside independent directors,” proof of the board’s 
good faith and reasonable investigation is “materially enhanced.”  
Furthermore, the presence of a majority of outside directors, 
coupled with a showing of reliance on advice by legal and 
financial advisors, “constitutes a prima facie showing of good 
faith and reasonable investigation.” . . . The rationale behind 
materially enhancing the proof of good faith and reasonableness 
of those decisions made by a majority of outside independent 
directors is directly related to the primary concern that enhanced 
scrutiny under Unocal is designed to address:  that a board might 
adopt defensive measures simply to retain control, whether or not 
those measures are in the best interest of shareholders.  Where 
decisions are made by outside independent directors instead of 
members of management who have a presumptive desire to retain 
their employment, the concern that the board’s decisions are 
tainted by self-serving motives is mitigated, and there naturally 
follows a greater presumption of good faith and reasonable 
investigation.  This is the essence of the material enhancement 
rubric in Unocal and its progeny.
89
 
More subtle evidence that Delaware courts applying the enhanced business 
judgment test are more deferential to a board than they admit exists as well. 
The first bit of evidence is that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to 
create a new test rather than dip into its existing arsenal of tests to monitor 
this conflict of interest.  In other words, having accepted shareholder 
contentions that the business judgment rule was inapplicable because 
directors faced a conflict of interest, the court could have resorted to its 
traditional monitor for conflict issues, namely, the entire fairness test.
90
  In 
the context of defensive tactics, the entire fairness test would require the 
court to analyze whether it was fair for the board to engage in a defensive 
tactic regardless of whether the process surrounding the employment of the 
tactic was, itself, fair.  As Professor Gilson persuasively argued: 
Applying a fairness standard to this decision, however, requires a 
court to determine whether it was “fair” for control to remain 
with management rather than shift to the offeror.  And this 
inquiry must necessarily focus on whether the shareholders 
would be better off with existing management or by selling their 
shares.
91
 
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal shied away from 
 
 89.  Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
39, at *43-44, *50-51 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010), aff’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del.  2010). 
 90.  See supra note 38, 64 and accompanying text. 
 91.  Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against 
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 827 (1981). 
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requiring target directors to prove that their conduct was entirely fair, as 
that test would have required the court to evaluate the management of both 
the target and the offeror to determine whether the target board’s decision 
to employ any defensive tactic was merited.  Instead, the Delaware 
Supreme Court created a new test, the enhanced business judgment rule, 
with a completely different focus from the entire fairness test.  Instead of 
bearing the enormous burden of proving that it was fair for them to engage 
in defensive tactics because they had a better plan than did the offeror, 
target directors under this newly-created test must prove merely that they 
complied with their fiduciary duties.
92
 
Second, while conceding that directors have a conflict of interest, the 
court nevertheless crafted in Unocal a test that is exceedingly deferential to 
directors.  Although forty-seven cases have been decided under Unocal,
93
 
 
 92.  The first prong of Unocal requires the board to show good faith and reasonable 
investigation to identify the threat to corporate policy, which requires care and good faith.  
The second prong of Unocal requires the board to respond proportionately to the threat 
posed, and to do so with due care.  See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 53, at 330–37 (1987) 
(describing the two prongs of the Unocal test). 
 93.  These forty-seven cases are:  Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 
(Del. 2010); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); In re Santa 
Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In 
re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 
1990); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 
531 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Frantz Mfg. 
Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442 (Del. Ch. 2011); 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Dollar Thrifty 
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 
1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010); Perlegos v. Atmel Corp., C.A. Nos. 2320-N, 2321-N, 2007 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2007); Black v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 872 A.2d 559 (Del. Ch. 
2005); Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2004); Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Servs., 805 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 2002); Hills Stores Co. v. 
Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 
2000); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re 
Lukens Inc., S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999); NiSource Capital Mkts., Inc. v. 
Columbia Energy Grp., C.A. No. 17341, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 
1999); In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 14713, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94 
(Del. Ch. May 24, 1999); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998); H.F. 
Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., Civil Action No. 15650, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 
(Del. Ch. June 3, 1997); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp., C.A. No. 14623, 
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996); Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 
(Del. Ch. 1995); Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792 
(Del. Ch. 1993); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C. A. Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 Del. Ch. 
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only one has failed Unocal’s first step,
94
 and only nine have failed Unocal’s 
second step,
95
 producing a total failure rate of only twenty-one percent,
96
 or 
 
LEXIS 134 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1991); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 
1990); Tomczk v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., C.A. No. 7861, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 5, 1990); In re DeSoto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb 5, 1990); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342 
(Del. Ch. 1989); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989); 
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd., 558 A.2d 1049; City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 
1988); Henley Grp. Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., C.A. No. 9569, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. 
Ch. 1987); Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 9173, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 474 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton, & Co., 519 A.2d 103 
(Del. Ch. 1986); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. 
Ch. 1985).  Cf. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. 
Ch. 1998) (invalidating defensive tactic under Unocal), aff’d on other grounds, 721 A.2d 
1281 (Del. 1998); Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(suggesting that Unocal would be a better structure than Blasius for reviewing case). 
 94.  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d 1. 
 95.  Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (finding that the lack of a fiduciary out 
impermissibly locked up the deal, making the defensive measures preclusive and coercive, 
and therefore, a violation of Unocal); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 
(finding the use of a poison pill in a discriminatory manner and authorizing a repurchase 
program were unreasonable responses in relation to the threat posed, and therefore a 
violation of Unocal); Frantz Mfg. Co., 501 A.2d 401 (holding that funding an ESOP in an 
unauthorized manner was done with the purpose of perpetuating the board’s control over the 
company, and therefore was an unreasonable response that violated Unocal); Chesapeake 
Corp., 771 A.2d 293 (finding a violation of Unocal through the use of a supermajority 
bylaw, which the court found was a preclusive and unjustified impairment of the 
stockholder franchise); Carmody, 723 A.2d 1180 (finding that the board’s unilateral 
adoption of a dead hand provision was done for entrenchment purposes, and was a 
preclusive and disproportionate defensive response in violation of Unocal); Grand Metro. 
Pub. Ltd., 558 A.2d 1049 (concluding the directors’ decision to keep the poison pill in place 
was not reasonable in relationship to any threat posed, thereby constituting a violation of 
Unocal); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 551 A.2d 787 (finding that the board’s 
determination to leave the stock rights in effect was a defensive step that, in the 
circumstances of the offer and at the stage of the contest for control, was not a reasonable 
response to the threat posed and thus violated Unocal); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d 
1227 (finding defensive tactic failed Unocal because plaintiffs demonstrated that 
restructuring was an unreasonable and disproportionate antitakeover response); AC 
Acquisitions Corp, 519 A.2d 103 (stating that it was not reasonable in relation to the threat 
to structure an equity option for shareholders that precluded them from accepting the hostile 
offer).  Three other cases deserve mention:  MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 
(Del. 2003), which found that an independent board failed the Blasius test within the Unocal 
framework; Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25, aff’d on other grounds, 721 A.2d 
1281, which found that an otherwise independent board violated Unocal, and while the 
Delaware Supreme Court faulted the board’s conduct, the Supreme Court’s holding was on 
grounds other than a Unocal violation; and Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d 1227, rev’d, 
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which found that a board’s defensive tactic failed Unocal, 
whereupon the board abandoned that failed defensive tactic and instituted a different plan, 
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a success rate of seventy-nine percent.  This seventy-nine percent success 
rate is itself revealing of the courts’ deference, given that Unocal requires 
the board to bear the burden of proof and whoever has that burden is 
supposed to be more likely to lose.
97
  Moreover, of the thirty-seven cases 
that passed Unocal, thirty-one had boards with a majority of independent 
directors, two did not, and courts in four cases did not provide this 
information.
98
  Directors’ seventy-nine percent success rate under Unocal 
increased to a minimum of eighty-four percent when they had independent 
boards.
99
  These numbers demonstrate that courts engaging in a Unocal 
review defer heavily to independent boards. 
Further analysis of the ten cases that failed Unocal shows that one of 
these cases did not identify the composition of the board,
100
 five involved 
 
which the Delaware Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal; 
ultimately the board failed the Revlon test. 
 96.  This twenty-one percent failure rate is similar to the results obtained by analyzing 
the number of opinions, rather than the number of cases, decided under Unocal.  There are 
fifty-nine opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court, and only 
eleven of these opinions held that the board violated its Unocal duties—a failure rate of 
eighteen percent. 
 97.  See, e.g., Stephen Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the 
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L.  REV. 197, 277 (1988) (contending that 
“[w]hichever side . . . ultimately inherits the final burden of proof is likely to lose in any 
legal confrontation”); Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change 
in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 61, 66 (2008) (“If 
all things are equal in a case, the party who would win is the one who does not have the 
burden of proof.”); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2004) (“[T]he legal endgame is to place the burden of proof on the other side.  Whoever 
has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and 
Transcendentalism: You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 700 
(1994) (“If we presume the evidence was damaging to the [defendant], then the 
[defendant] . . . is likely to lose.  If we place the burden on the other party . . . , then it is 
unlikely to be able to meet that burden.”). 
 98.  Of the thirty-seven cases that passed Unocal, Reis and Phillips were the only two 
that did not have independent boards.  The courts in the following four cases did not identify 
whether or not the board was independent:  Orman, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 140; NiSource 
Capital Mkts, Inc., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198; Wells Fargo & Co., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3; 
and In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342.  The court noted in the 
remaining thirty-one cases that the majority of the board was independent.  But see Yucaipa 
Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P., 1 A.3d at 346 n.214, (refusing to defer to a board with a majority 
of independent directors because the board had only a “bare majority of independent 
directors” who “never engaged in any separate deliberations” without the other directors and 
where some of the advisors to the board were not independent). 
 99.  The minimum success rate of eighty-four percent derives from the fact that while 
thirty-one of the thirty-seven cases that passed Unocal had independent boards, courts in 
four other cases where boards passed this test did not identify whether the board was 
independent.  See supra text at note 98 (listing cases in which the board passed the Unocal 
test but the court did not identify whether the board was independent). 
 100.  In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59. 
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corporations where the majority of directors were not independent,
101
 and 
four were independent.
102
  Three of these four cases where an independent 
board failed its Unocal duties involved boards adopting defensive tactics 
that the court found to be draconian,
103
 and one of these cases resulted from 
the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the board’s decision to keep a 
poison pill in place in the face of a viable tender offer that posed no threat 
to the corporation was unreasonable.
104
  In other words, these independent 
boards engaged in extreme or unreasonable conduct. 
This analysis demonstrates that not only are boards highly successful 
(seventy-nine percent) under Unocal, but boards consisting of a majority of 
 
 101.  Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 
A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 
(Del. Ch. 1988); and AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 
(Del. Ch. 1986). 
 102.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Carmody v. 
Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 
1988).  Cf. supra note 93 (discussing Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys. Inc., 
728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003); 
Robert M. Bass Grp. Inc., 552 A.2d 1227). 
 103.  Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914; Carmody, 723 A.2d 1180; Robert M. Bass Grp., 
Inc., 552 A.2d 1227.  Each of these three cases deserves some explanation.  In Bass, the 
board abandoned the defensive tactic that failed Unocal, and instituted a different plan, 
which the Delaware Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal; the 
board failed the Revlon test.  Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d 1227.  In Carmody, the 
chancery court held that a “dead hand” provision is coercive, and therefore draconian, when 
it prohibits newly elected directors from implementing a pill.  Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1195.  
The court reasoned that such a provision makes a proxy contest ‘realistically unattainable.’ 
Id.  In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a diluted version of the Carmody 
pill, namely, a delayed-redemption pill, on grounds that even the diluted version of the 
poison pill exceeded the scope of the board’s authority under section 141(a).  Quickturn 
Design Sys. Inc., 721 A.2d 1281.  Finally, it is questionable whether Omnicare should have 
even been decided under Unocal, rather than under the business judgment rule.  As the 
dissent points out, this case should have been decided under the business judgment rule, not 
under Unocal, because the merger covenants were not defensive; rather than running from a 
hostile tender offer, the target board openly solicited offers, and tied up the one and only 
firm offer it received.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 940-946 (Veasy, J., dissenting); 
see also infra note 233 (questioning whether Omnicare should have been decided under 
Unocal).  Second, the reason that the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court held it was a 
violation of the second prong of Unocal was that it is preclusive to lock up a deal without a 
fiduciary out.  Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 918.  Although the majority did not label its 
holding as a “new rule of law,” the dissent, written by Chief Justice Veasey, characterizes 
this requirement for a fiduciary out as a new rule.  Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 940–46 
(Veasy, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text (expanding upon 
the Unocal majority’s requirement of a fiduciary out). 
 104.  Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co., 558 A.2d at 1060 (reasoning that the board’s decision 
to keep the poison pill in place was preclusive and not proportional to the threat posed). 
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independent directors are almost guaranteed to win:  Only four independent 
boards have failed Unocal.  Faced with the choice of making a difficult 
decision itself or relying instead on the board—particularly one with a 
majority of independent directors—the Delaware Supreme Court has 
chosen, in reality, to rely on target directors.  Despite professed concern 
about the board’s conflict of interest when it faces a hostile tender offer, the 
Delaware Supreme Court created a monitor that tacitly lets boards enact all 
but the most extreme defensive tactics.  Thus, the enhanced business 
judgment test leaves a concededly conflicted board in charge of deciding 
whether and how to fight the tender offer, limited only by those actions that 
a court would classify as preclusive, coercive, or unreasonable.  Tellingly, 
the Delaware Supreme Court has chided the Court of Chancery for 
invalidating defensive tactics that were merely “unnecessary.”
105
 
Before leaving Unocal and the enhanced business judgment test, two 
points are worth noting.  One is that the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Unocal chose to permit target boards to enact defensive tactics, allegedly 
under judicial supervision.  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, had an 
entirely different option, which it rejected:  The court could have held that 
boards may not enact defensive tactics at all.  Such a holding would have 
let the market decide the target’s fate by allowing bidders unfettered access 
to target shareholders.
106
  Reliance on the market is, in fact, one monitor the 
court subsequently chose for the Revlon test.
107
 
Second, while the court’s main reliance in Unocal was on the 
independent directors, the court backstopped that reliance with a safety 
valve:  The defensive tactic cannot preclude shareholder voting rights, so 
that shareholders unhappy with their directors’ defensive tactics can vote 
those directors out of office.
108
  Since all shares, rather than just 
 
 105.  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 
1361, 1385–86 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. 
S’holders Litig.), C.A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, *32 (Del. Ch. 1994)). 
 106.  In Unocal, had the court precluded boards from engaging in any defensive tactics, 
the market would have determined the success or failure of the tender offer.  Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164, 1182–83 (1981) (arguing that, 
when faced with a tender offer, shareholder welfare is maximized when management is 
passive so that shareholders can decide the sufficiency of the market’s offer); Ronald J. 
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 846, 865–67 (1981) (arguing that defensive tactics to 
tender offers are inappropriate because they interrupt the target shareholders’ ability to 
freely consider whether to hold or sell their stock on the market). 
 107.  See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s requirement 
that directors engage the market as a means of assuring a fair transaction price). 
 108.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“If the 
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
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disinterested ones, can vote in an election of directors, and since such a 
vote will occur after the directors have enacted their defensive tactics, this 
vote provides only indirect control over a board’s response to a hostile 
tender offer.
109
 
In sum, the enhanced business judgment test, as developed and 
applied in Unocal, has been little more than a paper tiger.  Delaware courts 
have permitted boards—especially independent ones—to enact all but the 
most egregious defensive tactics under the veneer of judicial review. 
 
B. Revlon 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that if the corporation is in a 
“Revlon mode,”
110
 the court will apply enhanced business judgment
111
 to 
evaluate the board’s efforts to achieve “maximization of the company’s 
value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”
112
  Moreover, as in Unocal, 
Delaware courts will afford some degree of deference to a board consisting 
of a majority of independent directors.
113
  Furthermore, just as target 
 
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”); see also Unitrin, Inc., 651 
A.2d at 1388–89 (requiring proxy contest to remain viable in order for a defensive tactic to 
avoid being preclusive); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 337 
n.182 (Del. Ch. 2010) (explaining that the defensive tactic must leave an insurgent with a 
“fair chance for victory,” rather than a “slight possibility of victory,” in order for a defensive 
tactic to avoid being preclusive); cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 
698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (reasoning under the business judgment 
rule that when directors make poor business decisions, redress must come from the 
shareholders, rather than from courts); see also David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the 
Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (2007) (reasoning that wealth is 
maximized by directors who know that their decisions will ultimately be reviewed by 
investors but not by the courts). 
 109.  In contrast, under the entire fairness test, the vote by the disinterested shares on the 
transaction serves to monitor that transaction.  See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Delaware courts’ belief in the efficacy of disinterested share votes as an 
external monitor). 
 110.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the triggers that will put a 
corporation in Revlon mode). 
 111.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989) 
(requiring courts to use enhanced scrutiny when a corporation is in a Revlon mode); see also 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (applying 
enhanced scrutiny after deciding that the corporation was in a Revlon mode and explaining 
the key features of enhanced scrutiny are that the directors have the burden to prove they 
were adequately informed and acted reasonably). 
 112.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1985). 
 113.  Id. at 176 n.3 (describing the composition of the Revlon board and stating that the 
court “cannot conclude that this board is entitled to certain presumptions that generally 
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directors under Unocal can enact a wide variety of defensive tactics, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has similarly held that “there is no single 
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties” under Revlon.
114
 
Although courts will review both Unocal and Revlon under the 
enhanced business judgment rule and give deference to independent 
boards, the goals of Unocal and Revlon within this common standard of 
review differ.  Unocal is designed to evaluate whether a board, in its effort 
to keep its corporation independent, has reasonably identified a threat to 
that independence and has enacted defensive tactics within a wide range of 
reasonableness.  Revlon, in contrast, imposes a specific task on directors:  
attempt to maximize shareholder value.  Director discretion in Revlon is 
broad on how best to achieve that narrow mandate, but the goal is, itself, 
limiting and specific.  Delaware courts have sought to situate these Revlon 
duties within the broader context of the directors’ fiduciary duties, stressing 
that once the board convinces the court that it has sought to maximize 
shareholder value, the court will defer to the board’s decision: 
“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be 
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a 
perfect decision.  If a board selected one of several reasonable 
alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even 
though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may 
have cast doubt on the board’s determination.” . . . Thus, where 
the board has sought the best value reasonably available for the 
shareholders, it will be found to have acted reasonably and as 
required by its fiduciary duties.
115
 
 
attach to the decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly outside independent 
directors”); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 58 (George 
Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 159, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=801308 (reasoning that 
Delaware courts “repeatedly made clear the almost sanitizing effect that a majority-
independent board . . . would have on corporate behavior in transactions involving conflicts 
of interest”). 
 114.  Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); accord, Lyondell 
Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (stating that no court can tell directors 
how to maximize price for shareholders because each corporation faces a “unique 
combination of circumstances”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 
192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Our case law recognizes that [there] are a variety of sales approaches 
that might be reasonable, given the circumstances facing particular corporations.”). 
 115.  Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, C.A. No. 16301, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *42 
(Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 45); see also In re Lear 
Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch. 2007)  (reasoning that when in the Revlon 
mode, “[b]ecause there can be several reasoned ways to try to maximize value, the court 
cannot find fault so long as the directors chose a reasoned course of action”); In re J.P. 
Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,  783 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that since 
“reasonable directors, exercising honest, informed judgment, might differ as to what course 
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Thus, Delaware courts have stressed that directors must act to try to 
maximize shareholder value, but boards will not be liable either for 
differences of opinion of what is the best price
116
 or for failing to foresee 
that a better bid would emerge in the future.  After commenting that courts 
must review the board’s compliance with its fiduciary duties and the 
board’s efforts to promote shareholder interests, the Delaware Chancery 
Court in In re Fort Howard Shareholders Litigation stated that “the validity 
of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn upon how accurately the 
board did foresee the future.”
117
 
In addition to the different goals of Unocal and Revlon, Revlon’s 
admonition that boards may use covenants only in their effort to achieve 
maximum shareholder value
118
 highlights another difference from Unocal:  
Revlon relies on the market to monitor directors’ compliance with their 
Revlon duties.  As the court in Revlon stated, “directors cannot fulfill their 
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.  
Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s 
shareholders the best price available for their equity.”
119
  The teachings 
from all of the Delaware Revlon decisions require boards to engage the 
 
of action would most likely maximize shareholder interests,” the court will defer to the 
expertise of the directors). 
 116.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(“Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future.  The test therefore cannot be whether, with 
hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best price.”); In re J.P. Stevens S’holders Litig. 
at 781 n.6 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that obtaining the best possible transaction for the 
shareholders “does not mean that material factors other than ‘price’ ought not to be 
considered and, where appropriate, acted upon by the board.  Such factors might include 
form of consideration, timing of the transaction or risk of non-consummation”); Golden 
Cycle LLC, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *49-51 (applying the rationale from In re J.P. 
Stevens and determining that the decision to accept a merger bid that was $.50 less than a 
second bid was defensible under Revlon as the higher bid was conditional and would trip a 
termination fee and reimbursement provisions of the deal with the other corporation). 
 117.  C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *41 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); see 
Golden Cycle, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *49 (approving deal at $19.50 over subsequent 
deal at $20 because deal at $19.50 was the highest-price deal at time of board’s decision); 
see also infra notes 124–26 (noting that Delaware courts expect boards to comply with their 
fiduciary duties but do not expect boards to be clairvoyant). 
 118.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989) 
(reiterating Revlon lesson that covenants are not illegal per se but recognizing that since 
covenants foreclose further bidding, they are illegal unless they generate a substantial 
benefit to target shareholders); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig, C.A. No. 10350, 
1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding the target board failed its Revlon duties 
when it precluded an auction by granting a lock up, termination fee, and reimbursement 
provision to one bidder without notifying the second bidder that the board, contrary to its 
previous position, decided to sell the corporation); see also Revlon discussion supra notes 
51–55. 
 119.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. 
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market in ways most relevant to their corporation; when boards so act, 
courts can comfortably defer to the resulting transaction price.
120
  Thus, 
while corporations are not necessarily required to “shop” the company, 
Delaware courts have been skeptical of those cases where there is no 
market information on the best price for target stock.
121
  For example, in 
Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court warned: 
When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable 
grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for 
fairness demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher 
bids may be elicited.  When, however, the directors possess a 
body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a 
transaction, they may approve that transaction without 
conducting an active survey of the market . . . [but] the 
circumstances in which this passive approach is acceptable are 
limited.  “A decent respect for reality forces one to admit that . . . 
advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute 
for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant 
market can provide.”
122
 
Therefore, when boards and their financial advisors actively canvas 
the market, they sustain their burden of proving that they were sufficiently 
 
 120.  See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(reviewing steps the board took to assess the market and concluded that since the board’s 
“approach was a reasonable one, that was the product of considerable deliberation,” the 
court would defer to the board’s judgment); see also, Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 
A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (faulting  for its good faith analysis, but not faulting the Court of 
Chancery for its view that when corporations are in a Revlon mode, boards “must confirm 
that they have obtained the best available price either by conducting an auction, by 
conducting a market check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of the market’”) 
(citing Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *19 
(Del Ch. July 29, 2008); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (rejecting the board’s “excuse for the lack of any attempt at canvassing the 
strategic market”); McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1033-1034 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 
873 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2005) (reasoning that because a merger agreement was preceded by an 
active canvassing of the market with the help of its financial advisors, the board sustained its 
burden that the directors were sufficiently informed about the adequacy of the transaction 
price). 
 121.  McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d at 1033 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 873 A.2d 1099 (Del. 
2005) (explaining that when there is no market check, the court’s analysis will include a 
review of the information on which the board based its decision and the reasonableness of 
the directors’ conduct); In re Desoto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. 1990) (faulting management which “made no effort to canvas 
the market to learn if there were other possible suitors or even to preliminarily learn of a 
canvas of the market would be worthwhile”). 
 122.  567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (second alteration in original) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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informed about the adequacy of the transaction price.
123
  Thus, in Barkan, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board that had put the company in 
play and had redeemed its poison pill five weeks before the MBO deal 
closed, satisfied its Revlon duties, reasoning that “when it is widely known 
that some change of control is in the offing and no rival bids are 
forthcoming over an extended period of time, that fact is supportive of the 
board’s decision to proceed.”
124
  Implicit in these Revlon cases is an 
understanding that a good-faith search period will necessarily have a fixed 
closing date.
125
  Delaware courts obviously do not expect boards to be 
omniscient about the future; one Delaware court emphatically stated:  
“Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future.  The test therefore cannot 
be whether, with hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best 
price.”
126
 
Similarly, because Revlon review requires a commitment to an 
effective market check, Delaware courts are leery of covenants that are 
“show stoppers.”
127
  The courts’ reliance on the market in a Revlon review 
stands in sharp contrast to Unocal, where the Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected the option of letting the market monitor tender offers.
128
 
Despite these differences between Unocal and Revlon, their common 
framework of enhanced business judgment review with deference to 
independent directors has produced results that strongly favor target 
directors under both tests.  Like Unocal, corporations in a Revlon mode 
have won the vast majority of their cases.  Of the thirty-nine cases that 
 
 123.  Id. at 1288 (reasoning that as the “crucial element supporting a finding of good 
faith is knowledge,” the board convinced the chancery court that the timing, publicity, tax 
advantages and the corporation’s declining performance made a market test unnecessary, a 
finding with which the Delaware Supreme Court agreed); McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d at 
1033–34 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing the use of independent financial advisors as a factor in 
directors’ proof that the board was adequately informed about the market). 
 124.  Id. at 1287. 
 125.  In re Toys “R” Us S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008–12 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(sustaining the board’s decision to accept a deal after an open market check of one year 
produced no capable buyers). 
 126.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011); In 
re Fort Howard S’holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 at 40–41 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(stating that a disinterested, well-informed board acting in good faith could lock up a deal 
because it could not be responsible for knowing what other deals might emerge in the 
future). 
 127.  In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350 (Del. Ch. 1988), slip op. 
at 16–17 (citations omitted) (reasoning that the “lock-up was nothing but a ‘show stopper’ 
that effectively precluded the opening act.”); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, 
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989) (differentiating between valid lock-ups which “draw 
bidders into a battle” and invalid lock-ups “which end an active auction and foreclose 
further bidding”). 
 128.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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found a corporation to be in a Revlon mode,
129
 courts in thirty-one cases (or 
seventy-nine percent) held that the boards had met their Revlon duties.
130
  
 
 129.  While the corporation was found to be in Revlon mode in thirty-nine cases, forty-
eight Delaware courts, consisting of eleven Delaware Supreme Court opinions and thirty-
seven Court of Chancery opinions, decided these cases.  See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 
A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 
567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 
(Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); In re Smurfit-
Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del. 
Ch. May 20, 2011); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. 
No. 6373-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011); Binks v. DSL.net,Inc., 
C.A. No. 2823-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 98 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Dollar 
Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Bernal, C.A. 
No. 4663-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2009); In re Lear Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007); Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. 
Ch. 2007); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 
A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004); Cirrus Holding Co. v. Cirrus Indus., 794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 
2001); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001); 
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Lukens, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, C.A. No. 16301, 1998 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); Emerson Radio Corp. v. Int’l Jensen, Inc., 
C.A. No. 14992, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1996); Kahn ex. rel. Burnup 
& Sims v. Caporella, C.A. No. 13248, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29 (Del. Ch. March 10, 1994); 
Rand v. W. Air Lines, C.A. No. 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994); 
Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792 (Del. Ch. 1993); 
In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 196 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., C.A. No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 
9212, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990); Crown Books Corp. v. 
Bookstop, Inc., C.A. No. 11255, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1990); In re De 
Soto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
5, 1990); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., C.A. Nos. 11208, 11253, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 174 
(Del. Ch.Dec. 19, 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 1989); In re Holly Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, C.A. 
No. 10,095, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); In re Fort. Howard Corp. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); In re 
J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 130.  Of the thirty-nine cases that found the corporation to be in a Revlon mode, see 
supra note 129, judges held that thirty-one of the boards in these cases had met their Revlon 
duties.  See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); Walker v. Lukens, 757 A.2d 
1278 (Del. 2000); Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc, 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1994); Sea-Land Corp. 
S’holder Litig. v. Abely, No. 147, 1993, 1993 Del. LEXIS 362 (Del. Sept. 21, 1993); Gilbert 
v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 571 A.2d 787 
(Del. 1990); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Citron v. Fairchild 
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Of those cases with successful outcomes, seventy-seven percent had boards 
with a majority of independent directors.
131
  Thus, just as the Delaware 
courts are quite deferential to independent boards under Unocal, Delaware 
courts most often deferred to independent boards under Revlon as well.
132
 
 
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); In re Orchid 
Cellmark, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6373-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. 
May 12, 2011); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011); Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., C.A. No. 2823-
VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 98 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder 
Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 
2007); Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 
A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004); Cirrus Holding Co. v. Cirrus Indus., 794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 
2001); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001); 
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allen, 
C.A. No. 16301, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); Emerson Radio Corp. 
v. Int’l Jensen, Inc., C.A. No. 14992, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1996); 
Kahn Ex. Rel Burnup & Sims v. Caporella, C.A. No. 13248, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 10, 1994); In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 196 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (assuming without deciding that corporation 
had Revlon duties, but board did not breach those duties); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., C.A. 
No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990); Freedman v. Restaurant 
Assoc. Indus. Inc., C.A. No. 9212, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990); 
Crown Books Corp. v. Bookstop, Inc., C.A. No. 11255, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 28, 1990); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, C.A. No. 10,095, 1988 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); In re Fort. Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); and In re J.P. Stevens & Co. 
S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); cf. In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig., 
C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *13 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2012) (denying 
rehearing of previously-denied motion to dismiss as court held pleadings that board 
breached its Revlon duties were sufficient to proceed to trial); In re Celera Corp. S’holder 
Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 66, at *2–9, 34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) 
(agreeing that corporation was in a Revlon mode but rejecting a challenge by the largest 
shareholder to a settlement of a class action lawsuit arising from a Revlon merger); In re 
Delphi Fin. Group S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, at *49–
52 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (denying preliminary injunction of a Revlon merger as claims 
that board violated its Revlon duties were insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood of 
success at trial); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(holding that plaintiffs had a reasonable likelihood of successfully showing that board 
violated its Revlon duties, but nevertheless refusing to grant a preliminary injunction of the 
merger because  no other bid had been submitted and the stockholders could choose whether 
to accept or refuse the merger offer); In re Micromet, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 
7197-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41, at *41 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (denying preliminary 
injunction of a Revlon merger because none of plaintiffs’ claims had a reasonable likelihood 
of success). 
 131.  Of the thirty-one cases with successful outcomes, supra note 130, twenty-four had 
independent boards, which yields a seventy-seven percent success rate. 
 132.  See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Corti, C.A. No. 3534-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. 
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Interestingly, having an independent board was not outcome 
determinative, as five
133
 of the eight
134
 cases in which the board failed its 
Revlon duties had independent boards.  The five cases which faulted 
independent directors, however, are easily explained:  In one case, the court 
 
LEXIS 126, at *56 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009), aff’d, 996 A.2d 795 (Del. 2010) (refusing to 
make an “independent business judgment of whether the consideration obtained for the 
shareholders was adequate” and instead limiting its review in Revlon to the board’s 
decision-making process). 
 133.  The five cases where independent boards failed their Revlon duties were:  
Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition 
Corp. v. MacMillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) QVC (both courts); In re Netsmart 
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 
926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re De Soto Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 11221, 11222, 
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); cf. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 
3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105 (Del. Ch. July, 29 2008); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. 
v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); see infra note 134. 
 134.  These eight failures produced nine opinions, three by the Delaware Supreme Court 
and six by the Delaware Court of Chancery.  See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 
1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); 
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Bernal, C.A. No. 4663-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111 (Del. Ch. 
June 26, 2009); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); QVC Network Inc. v. 
Paramount Commc’ns, 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993); In re De Soto, Inc. S’holder Litig., 
C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); In re Holly 
Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 
1988).  It should be noted, however, that the Court of Chancery in Topps faulted the target 
board solely in failing to release the competing bidder from its standstill agreement.  925 
A.2d 58, 92 (Del. Ch. 2010).  Cf. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 105 (Del. Ch. July, 29 2008) (refusing to grant directors’ motion for 
summary judgment as court had concerns that board breached its fiduciary duty of good 
faith in fulfilling their Revlon duties).  Ryan v. Lyondell was reversed on grounds that board 
had not violated its duty of good faith, but leaving intact the Court of Chancery’s view that 
corporation was in a Revlon mode.  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2000); 
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, n.30 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that 
although plaintiff contended the board’s conduct violated both Unocal and Revlon, the 
court’s decision to grant an injunction on Unocal grounds “makes it unnecessary to (and the 
Court therefore does not) address the plaintiffs’ claim under Revlon.”).  After the Court of 
Chancery found that an independent board’s defensive tactic failed Unocal, id. at 1238–39, 
the board abandoned that failed defensive tactic and instituted a different plan.  Therefore, 
the case that ultimately went to the Delaware Supreme Court was about the viability of the 
board’s restructuring plan (rather than the original defensive tactic), which the Delaware 
Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).  Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that the board failed the Revlon test.  Id. at 1284–88; see also supra note 93 (discussing Bass 
v. Evans in the Unocal context).  In addition, one district court, applying Delaware law, held 
that the board breached its Revlon duties.  Black & Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 
F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988). 
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excoriated the board for its failure to get any reliable market information,
135
 
and four of these cases directly tested the assumption that independent 
directors will act independently of corporate management.
136
  In these latter 
four cases, managers engaged in transactions motivated in part by their 
own self-interest, and the independent directors did little or nothing to stop 
them:  Management took action to further the deal that provided for 
management’s continued participation, rather than the deal that was best for 
their shareholders.
137
  These boards either allowed corporate management 
to tie up a lesser bid that favored themselves,
138
 or else interfered with their 
shareholders’ potential to maximize value by failing to explore the market 
fully.
139
  Thus, the Delaware courts perceived the directors in these cases as 
being only nominally independent of management, which remained largely 
free to engineer the transaction toward their own benefit.  For example, the 
 
 135.  In re Desoto, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *23 (faulting management who “made 
no effort to canvas the market to learn if there were other possible suitors or even to 
preliminarily learn if a canvas of the market would be worthwhile”). 
 136.  Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Netsmart, 924 A.2d 171; 
and Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 137.   Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (criticizing 
the Paramount board for tying up an inferior deal with Viacom, which included keeping the 
Paramount CEO as CEO of merged entity, in the face of a substantially better bid from 
QVC); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, n. 32 (Del. 1989) 
(reversing court below and enjoining consummation of lockup agreement between target 
corporation and a rival bidder because target board breached its duties of care and loyalty in 
locking up inferior deal in violation of the board’s Revlon duties, noting “th[e] board’s 
virtual abandonment of its oversight functions in the face of . . . [management’s] patent self-
interest was a breach of its fundamental duties of loyalty and care in the conduct of this 
auction . . . and created the atmosphere in which [management] . . . could act so freely and 
improperly”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (finding that because management believed its goals of continuing as management 
and obtaining a greater percentage of the equity would more likely be achieved with a 
private equity buyer than with a strategic buyer, management wrongly steered board away 
from exploring the strategic route); Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (granting preliminary injunction because the target board, in violation of its Revlon 
duties, refused to release the potentially higher bidder from its standstill agreement, thereby 
denying this bidder the chance to bid for the target, while target board simultaneously 
agreed to merge with the lower bidder who promised to retain existing target management).  
Cf. In re Holly Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164, *16–18 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (skipping over a determination of whether the board was 
independent, finding the board failed its Revlon duties by granting covenants to lock up a 
deal with a bidder who would keep the target and therefore, management, substantially 
intact without notifying the second bidder that the board, contrary to its previous position, 
had decided to sell the corporation). 
 138.  See supra note 137. 
 139.  In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); see 
supra note 137. 
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Delaware Supreme Court, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 
described the “allegedly ‘independent’ board”
140
 as “torpid, if not supine, in 
its efforts to establish a truly independent auction.”
141
 
Not surprisingly, materially deficient disclosure in proxy materials 
sometimes accompanied Revlon breaches, as boards failed to disclose their 
conduct that the court subsequently faulted.
142
  In Netsmart, for example, 
the court required the corporation to provide in the proxy materials not only 
some of the information plaintiff claimed was omitted regarding 
valuation,
143
 but also a fuller discussion of the board’s decision not to seek 
out any strategic buyers.
144
  Similarly, in In re The Topps Company 
Shareholders Litigation,
145
 the court required the target board to release the 
competing bidder from its standstill agreement so that it could present its 
argument to the target shareholders: 
[T]here is no reasonable basis for permitting the Topps board to 
deny its stockholders the chance to consider for themselves 
whether to prefer Upper Deck’s higher-priced deal, taking into 
account its unique risks, over Eisner’s lower-priced deal, which 
has its own risks. . . . But [Topps management] cannot at this 
point avoid an injunction on the unsubstantiated premise that the 
Topps stockholders will be unable, after the provision of full 
information, rationally to decide for themselves between two 
competing, non-coercive offers.
146
 
By insisting on full disclosure, the Delaware courts have drawn in the 
shareholder vote to monitor further the board’s conduct. 
Two lessons emerge from these Revlon cases.  One is that Delaware 
 
 140.  559 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Del. 1989). 
 141.  Id. at 1280. 
 142.  See Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A. 2d 58, 73 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that 
proxy materials were materially misleading in failing to disclose both a valuation that cast 
doubt on the fairness of the merger price, and a prospective merger partner’s assurances to 
target management that bidder would retain target management). 
 143.  In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 201.  The court agreed with plaintiffs that the proxy 
materials should have disclosed the projections the financial advisor employed in 
performing its discounting cash flow valuation that the advisor used to conclude that the 
proposed merger price was fair.  The court disagreed with plaintiffs that the proxy materials 
were otherwise materially incomplete.  Id. at 199–204 (holding that (i) the omitted May 11 
projections were not material, (ii) the description in the proxy materials of the financial 
advisor’s work was sufficient, and (iii) the proxy materials did not omit material information 
on the independence of the special committee).   
 144.  Id. at 209. 
 145.  926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 146.  Id. at 93 (citation omitted); see also In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 
924 A.2d at 206 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting an injunction to require full disclosure so 
shareholders can make their own investment decision). 
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courts will grant great deference to independent directors, but only when 
their conduct demonstrates true independence from management; in those 
cases that failed Revlon, the court determined that directors were only 
nominally independent.
147
  The second lesson is that Delaware courts 
strongly favor an unfettered transaction market, followed by disclosure to 
target shareholders, so that those shareholders can make their own 
investment decisions.
148
  Thus, in these Revlon cases, Delaware courts have 
curtailed their role to assuring that the directors are truly independent, the 
transaction market is unfettered, and disclosure to shareholders is complete; 
thereafter, the external monitors have supplanted judicial review. 
 
C. Entire Fairness 
As noted above,
149
 the Delaware courts diluted their own review under 
the Unocal and Revlon tests by deferring to independent directors.  
Moreover, in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court deferred to two other 
non-judicial monitors:  the market and the shareholder vote.  All of these 
monitors functioned within the framework of the relevant test:  In Unocal, 
the independence of the board minimized the directors’ conflict of interest, 
and in Revlon, the market and shareholder vote helped the court decide 
whether the board had sought the best price.  In contrast, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has not built any non-judicial monitor into the entire 
fairness test.  As such, when a court applies the entire fairness test, it does, 
in fact, do a searching and thorough inquiry through a process that is the 
antithesis of deference.
150
  As the court in Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting 
Corp. explained: 
Entire fairness is Delaware’s most onerous standard. When a 
 
 147.  See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Del. 
1989) (observing that “apparent domination of the allegedly ‘independent’ board by the 
financially interested members of management, coupled with the directors’ evident passivity 
in the face of their fiduciaries duties . . . continued unchanged”).  The Mills court also stated 
that “[i]n its decisions, the MacMillan board completely relied on management’s portrayal 
of Bass[,]” the rival bidder.  Id. at 1267.  “Here, not only was there such deception, but the 
board’s own lack of oversight in structuring and directing the auction afforded management 
the opportunity to indulge in the misconduct which occurred.”  Id. at 1279.  “The board was 
torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction . . .”  Id. at 1280. 
 148.  See In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“By issuing an injunction requiring additional 
disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice to think for themselves on full 
information, thereby vindicating their rights as stockholders to make important voting and 
remedial decisions based on their own economic self-interest.”). 
 149.  See discussion of Unocal, supra notes 93–99, and Revlon, supra notes 129–32. 
 150.  See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (describing the board’s heavy 
burden to prove entire fairness). 
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party challenging a board’s decision alleges and later proves facts 
sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule, “the burden 
then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the 
challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation 
and its shareholders.” Once entire fairness applies, the defendants 
must establish “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was 
the product of both fair dealing and fair price.” “Not even an 
honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be 
sufficient to establish entire fairness.  Rather, the transaction 
itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s 
beliefs.”
151
 
Nevertheless, while the entire fairness test mandates judicial scrutiny,
152
 
Delaware courts have supported alternative paths so that defendants can, in 
some circumstances, virtually or actually opt out of entire fairness review.  
These alternative paths gained prominence in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
153
 
which required the controlling shareholder to prove the entire fairness of its 
freeze-out merger.  The controlling shareholder claimed, however, that it 
did not control both sides of the transaction because it had ceded control 
when it agreed to vote its shares as the majority of the minority shares 
voted their shares.
154
  The Delaware Court of Chancery believed that such 
approval by the disinterested shares, combined with other factors, 
“conclusively sways the decision in favor of the defendants.”
155
  While the 
 
 151.  28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
 152.  In a typical transaction that is subject to entire fairness review, there are no 
monitors to which the court can defer:  the conflict voids reliance on directors, and 
enterprise transactions typically have no shareholder vote or market.  See, e.g., Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (reviewing under the entire fairness test without the 
support of any external monitors the board’s decision to repurchase shares from only one 
class of stock, which was the class the directors owned); Summa Corp. v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 407 (Del.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853 (1988) (finding that 
entire fairness applied because “the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, 
causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the 
subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to the minority stockholders of the 
subsidiary”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (applying entire 
fairness to a contract between two of the parent’s subsidiaries, as no external monitor 
existed for this transaction). 
 153.  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 154.  The controlling shareholder ceded its control by allowing the majority of the 
minority of shares to veto or approve the transaction.  However, since Delaware law 
requires a merger to be approved by a majority of outstanding shares, the majority had to 
cast its votes in order for the transaction to comply with Delaware law.  See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011).  Therefore, the controlling shareholder said it would vote its 
shares however the majority of the minority voted.  Since 51.9% of the minority shares 
voted for the merger, the majority cast its vote in favor of the merger as well.  Weinberger, 
457 A.2d at 708. 
 155.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev’d, 457 A.2d 
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Delaware Supreme Court discounted the shareholder vote because the 
controlling shareholder had not made a full disclosure,
156
 the court did not 
dispute the Court of Chancery’s logic that approval by disinterested shares 
could effectively monitor the transaction.  Subsequent cases have made 
clear that the vote must be a majority of those minority shares entitled to 
vote, rather than simply a majority of those voting.
157
  One Delaware Court 
of Chancery opinion explained the reasoning for requiring the majority of 
the outstanding minority shares as follows: 
The cleansing effect of ratification depends on the intuition that 
when most of the affected minority affirmatively approves the 
transaction, their self-interested decision to approve is sufficient 
proof of fairness to obviate a judicial examination of that 
question.  I do not believe that the same confidence flows then 
the transaction simply garners more votes in favor than votes 
against . . . from the minority who actually vote.  That position 
requires an untenable assumption that those who did not return a 
proxy were members of a ‘silent affirmative majority of the 
minority.’ . . . [A] failure to cast a ballot is a de facto no vote.
158
 
Reasoning that approval of the majority of minority shares is a 
powerful cleanser if there is full disclosure, the Supreme Court in 
Weinberger held that an informed approval by the minority shares would 
thereafter shift the burden to the plaintiff of proving unfairness.
159
  In 
reality, giving plaintiffs another chance to prove the board breached its 
duties under these circumstances may be merely cosmetic.  Plaintiffs would 
be quite unlikely to sustain their burden of proving unfairness after a 
majority of their peers have voluntarily and knowingly relinquished their 
 
701 (Del. 1983). 
 156.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (finding violation in controlling shareholder’s failure 
to disclose details of feasibility study prepared by controlling shareholder and some target 
directors). 
 157. See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 174, slip op. at 30 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (requiring a majority of the 
outstanding minority shares, not a majority of those voting, to constitute one of the “robust 
procedural protections . . . to ensure that the minority stockholders have sufficient 
bargaining power and the ability to make an informed choice of whether to accept the . . . 
offer for their shares”). 
 158.  In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, 
at *55 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006); cf. Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 50 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), aff’d, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990) (declining to shift the 
burden of proof where the majority of minority shares entitled to vote approved the 
transaction, but the vote was not expressly contingent on their approval). 
 159.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (affirming the proposition “that the plaintiff in a suit 
challenging a cash-out merger must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other 
items of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority”). 
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veto power and instead approved the transaction.  Delaware courts are 
reluctant to substitute their version of what is fair after shareholders have 
exercised their power to make their own investment decision.  As the Court 
of Chancery recently stated, “Delaware courts place great faith in the 
discernment and acumen of shareholders . . . [o]nly in extraordinary 
circumstances will this Court . . . usurp the rights of shareholders to make 
their own informed decisions.”
160
  Thus, such burden shifting seems largely 
superfluous and underscores the efficacy of the vote of the disinterested 
shares. 
The corporation must satisfy two requirements in order for the 
shareholder monitor to shift the burden of proof to plaintiff.  One, there 
must be full and fair disclosure of all material information to the 
shareholders.
161
  The freezeout cases, however, have isolated a second 
requirement:  The shareholder vote must be free from coercion.  For 
example, the Delaware Chancery Court in In re Pure Resources stated that 
a controlling shareholder transaction is coercive for minority shareholders 
“because the controlling stockholder threatens to take action after the 
tender offer that is harmful to the remaining minority . . . or because the 
offer’s back-end is so unattractive as to induce tendering at an inadequate 
price to avoid a worse fate[.]”
162
  When both factors are satisfied, however, 
Delaware courts defer heavily to the shareholder monitor.  As the Court of 
Chancery stated, “[w]hen, as here, plaintiffs seek to prevent shareholders 
from making a fundamental decision, they bear a heavy burden to persuade 
the Court that shareholders are somehow unable to provide for their own 
protection, or that effective use of the corporate franchise is barred by some 
critical lack of information.”
163
 
In addition to sanctioning disinterested share approval, Weinberger 
suggested a second alternative that the defendants could have pursued:  
 
 160.  La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Del. Ch. 
2007); see also In re Netsmart Techs., Inc., S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (noting that because there was no competing offer, it would be unwise to “enjoin the 
only deal on the table, when the stockholders can make that decision for themselves”). 
 161.  See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 702 (nullifying a shareholder vote under entire 
fairness because the board had not made full disclosure). 
 162.   In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 438 n.26 (Del. Ch. 2002); see 
also In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83 (Del. 
Ch. June 19, 2001) (holding that stockholders were free to accept or reject offers on their 
own, but that courts would intervene to protect their right to make a voluntary choice; 
voluntariness depended on the absence of improper coercion and the absence of disclosure 
violations); cf. Solomon v. Pathe, 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del. 1996) (noting that in the context 
of a controlling-shareholder tender offer, which does not require the controlling shareholder 
to offer a fair price, there must still be a lack of coercion and full disclosure to target 
shareholders). 
 163.  La. Mun. Police, 918 A.2d at 1176. 
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create a committee of independent directors to negotiate on behalf of the 
minority shares.
164
  The controlling shareholder in Kahn v. Lynch 
Communications Systems, Inc.
165
 pursued that suggestion.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court held that Lynch’s committee of independent directors had 
failed to act independently,
166
 noting that independence in this context 
requires the controlling shareholder not to dictate the terms of the merger, 
and instead to negotiate at arms-length with a committee that exercises real 
bargaining power.
167
  The Delaware Supreme Court held that a truly 
independent committee in a controlling-shareholder merger would negate 
the need for the defendant to prove the transaction’s fairness.  The court, 
however, rejected prior holdings that an effective special committee would 
invoke the business judgment rule,
168
 and instead held that, due to the 
pervasive power of the controlling shareholder, such a committee would 
merely shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove unfairness.
169
  Just 
as disinterested share approval appears to give plaintiffs no realistic 
argument as to why the court should hold the transaction is unfair,
170
 it 
seems similarly unlikely that plaintiffs could contend successfully that an 
independent committee had nevertheless produced an unfair deal.
171
 
 
 164.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (remarking that this case “could have been 
entirely different” had there been an independent committee to deal with the controlling 
shareholder at arm’s length, which would have provided “strong evidence” that the 
transaction is fair). 
 165.  638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter Kahn I]; 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) 
[hereinafter Kahn II]; see also discussion of Kahn infra notes 261–300. 
 166.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112. 
 167.  Id. at 1117.  For other cases where the independent committee did not function 
sufficiently well to shift the burden to plaintiff, see Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 
(Del. 1997); Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 82; Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 
1099 (Del. 1985); In re MAXXAM, Inc., Nos. 12,111 & 12,353, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 51 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1997), reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); Kahn v. Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores, Inc., No. 12,489, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 38 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996), 
reprinted in 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1143 (1996); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 870 (1989). 
 168.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1115; see infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Id. at 1117; accord Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) 
(holding that the entire fairness test, rather than the business judgment rule, continues to 
apply when the procedural monitors function effectively). 
 170.  See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
 171.  This argument would require a court to conclude that plaintiff proved that an 
independent committee had produced an unfair deal by acting in a grossly negligent manner 
in their negotiations.  A judge who felt that that the committee had not been aggressive 
enough would be more likely to conclude that the committee had not really been sufficiently 
independent, as it did in Kahn I.  See infra notes 282–83 (discussing the court’s reasoning in 
Kahn I as to why the special committee was not independent,); see, e.g., Citron v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990) (shifting the burden to plaintiff after 
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Thus, while defendants can shift the burden of proof, either by having 
an effective independent committee of directors or by securing the 
informed vote of the disinterested shares, Kahn v. Lynch held that entire 
fairness would always serve as the standard of review in controlling-
shareholder mergers.  More recent Delaware Court of Chancery cases have, 
however, sought to eliminate entire fairness review completely by making 
the business judgment rule applicable to controlling-shareholder freeze-out 
transactions effectuated by a tender offer followed by a short-form merger 
if boards provide for approval by both disinterested directors and 
disinterested shares.
172
  For example, in In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation,
173
 the Delaware Court of Chancery gave a ringing endorsement 
to the argument that under certain conditions, defendants could change the 
standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment, and refined 
these conditions stating: 
[I]f a first-step tender offer is both (i) negotiated and 
recommended by a special committee of independent directors 
and (ii) conditioned on the affirmative tender of a majority of the 
minority shares, then the business judgment standard of review 
presumptively applies to the freeze-out transaction.
174
 
 
finding that the independent committee functioned well, and holding that the plaintiff had 
been unable to prove the unfairness of the transaction).  It is possible, however, for a 
committee that is not independent to negotiate a fair deal.  Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 90 
(upholding the Court of Chancery’s determination on remand that the transaction was 
entirely fair, even though the court in Kahn I had determined that the independent 
committee had been coerced by the controlling shareholder). 
 172.  See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox 
Commc’ns, Inc., S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Pure Res., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002), appeal denied, C.A. No. 19876, 2002 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2002); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 83 (Del. Ch. 2001).  The court in CNX noted that it was working off the opinion in 
Cox Communications and, to the extent that Cox Communications can be read as allowing 
the burden to change from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, even if the 
independent committee is neutral on the proposed deal, CNX would disagree.  Instead, the 
court in CNX affirmatively required a recommendation from the committee.  CNX Gas 
Corp., 4 A.3d at 415. 
 173.  4 A.3d 397. 
 174.  Id. at 413.  The court in CNX contended that Cox Communications had effectively 
changed the prior law articulated in In re Pure Resources, which had delineated a three-part 
test for identifying when controlling shareholders two-step freeze-outs could be governed by 
the business judgment rule instead of by entire fairness:  A controlling shareholder tender 
offer will be deemed non-coercive if it is (i) subject to a non-waivable majority of the 
minority tender condition, (ii) the controlling shareholder commits to consummate a short-
form merger at the same price as the tender offer, and (iii) the controlling shareholder has 
not made any retributive threats.  In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 424; see also infra notes 292–
99 and accompanying text (discussing cases that reject Kahn’s holding that entire fairness is 
the proper standard of review for controlling-shareholder mergers). 
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In a third-party merger negotiated by the majority, where the majority 
and minority shares received different consideration, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery also agreed that when both structural protections are in place, the 
entire fairness test should not apply because the controlling shareholder is 
effectively on only one side of the transaction.
175
 
Thus, a substantial shift has occurred from Kahn v. Lynch, which 
contended that the pervasive strength of the controlling shareholder always 
required entire fairness review, to these newer Delaware cases, holding that 
controlling shareholders may escape the entire fairness review under 
certain conditions; in other words, a shift from judicial review to reliance 
on monitors.  The Delaware Court of Chancery has provided an 
explanation for this shift.  In In re Pure Resources, then Vice Chancellor 
Strine (now Chancellor Strine) noted that the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Kahn “saw the controlling stockholder as the 800-pound gorilla whose 
urgent hunger . . . is likely to frighten . . . putatively independent directors 
who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla . . . .”
176
  Current 
Court of Chancery decisions allowing the business judgment rule to govern 
under certain conditions do not repudiate Kahn’s argument about the 
capacity of a controlling shareholder to overreach, but instead incorporate 
those concerns into procedural requirements for controlling-shareholder 
transactions to qualify as non-coercive.
177
  Thus, these courts have provided 
content and depth to the external monitors, thereby allowing courts to rely 
comfortably on decisions made by independent directors and disinterested 
shares.  As the court in In re Pure Resources summarized: 
This does not mean that controlling stockholder tender offers do 
not pose risks to minority stockholders; it is only to acknowledge 
that the corporate law should not be designed on the assumption 
that diversified investors are infirm but instead should give great 
deference to transactions approved by them voluntarily and 
knowledgeably.
178
 
Similarly, in order to demonstrate the efficacy of disinterested committees 
combined with disinterested shares, the court in CNX cited numerous 
examples of independent committees and disinterested shares rebuffing a 
 
 175.  In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 174, at *42 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
 176.  In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 436.  The Court of Chancery further noted that Kahn’s 
view that independent directors could be so intimidated is “premised on a less trusting view 
of independent directors than is reflected in the important case of Aronson v. Lewis . . . 
which presumed that a majority of independent directors can impartially decide whether to 
sue a controlling stockholder.”  Id. at 436 n.17. 
 177.  See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 178–79. 
 178.  In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444. 
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controlling-shareholder transaction: 
Post-Lynch experience shows that special committees can 
negotiate effectively with controllers and that both special 
committees and minority stockholders can reject squeeze-out 
proposals. . . . These examples augur in favor of a unified 
standard under which independent directors and unaffiliated 
stockholders are given the tools to negotiate with controllers, 
backstopped by meaningful judicial review for fairness when 
those tools are withheld.
179
 
Thus, Delaware courts do a searching review under the entire fairness 
test.  Nevertheless, in those situations, where corporations can create an 
independent committee of directors and can submit the transaction to a vote 
of their disinterested shares, corporations can, at a minimum, shift the 
burden of proving unfairness to the plaintiff, and increasingly can opt out 
of the entire fairness test completely.  As a result, corporations can 
effectively substitute two external monitors—independent directors and the 
shareholder vote—for intrusive judicial review. 
Before leaving the discussion of entire fairness, it is worth contrasting 
the role of the monitors:  In Unocal and Revlon, the monitors functioned 
within those tests, while the monitors in the entire fairness test may change 
the standard of review.  Moreover, it is important to differentiate the 
shareholder vote as a monitor, as it is in entire fairness, from Unocal, 
where the shareholder vote is only a safety valve.  A vote by disinterested 
shares on a transaction whereby shareholders sell their stock provides a 
strong monitor because such a transaction will surely garner their attention.  
In contrast, a standard election of directors not only involves merely voting 
in general agreement or disagreement with the candidates for the board, but 
also will permit all shares, rather than just disinterested shares, to vote, 
thereby diluting any monitoring effect.  Thus, in order to serve as an 
effective monitor, the shareholder vote must be only by disinterested shares 
and only on the specific transaction, rather than simply a vote for or against 
candidates for the board of directors.
180
 
 
 
 179.  CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 413–14. 
 180.  See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder voting as a 
safety valve in Unocal); cf. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *114 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“[N]o Delaware case has 
held that burden-shifting can be accomplished by a tender of shares rather than by an actual 
vote.  Nor should a tender be treated as the equivalent of an informed vote.  Shareholders 
cannot be deemed to have ratified board action unless they are afforded the opportunity to 
express their approval of the precise conduct being challenged.”). 
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D. Blasius and Schnell 
Like the entire fairness test, Blasius and Schnell demand judicial 
review.  Although both Blasius and Schnell are largely applicable only in 
voting cases, they provide two different justifications for the proposition 
that only courts can monitor certain issues.  One is that, as in the Blasius 
fact pattern, there are simply no monitors available.  Given that the court in 
Blasius reasoned that the board had no power to decide who should serve 
as directors,
181
 the court could not rely on board monitoring.  Furthermore, 
since the board’s conduct stymied the shareholder vote, there was no 
shareholder vote to which the court could look for guidance.  Finally, there 
is no market for board seats.  As a result, judicial review was the sole 
option.  Thus, a court alone must determine if the directors’ primary 
purpose is to disenfranchise their shareholders, and whether the directors 
demonstrated a compelling purpose for their actions.  The second 
justification for judicial review, as in Schnell, is that the test requires the 
use of equitable powers, which obviously belong only to judges.  
Therefore, courts applying the Schnell doctrine cannot defer to the board, 
the disinterested shares, or the market. 
While courts have no choice other than to go it alone when applying 
the Blasius and Schnell standards, Delaware courts have made it extremely 
difficult to trigger either of these tests.  As noted above,
182
 the court in 
Blasius retreated from holding that directors who trip Blasius have acted 
per se illegally only because the court did not want to exclude the 
possibility that some scenario might warrant such board conduct.  The 
court’s consideration of making such board conduct per se illegal, however, 
coupled with the resulting test whereby directors must demonstrate a 
compelling purpose for disenfranchising their shareholders, strongly 
suggest that it is likely impossible for the board to pass this test.  As a result 
of this difficulty, courts are highly reluctant to trigger a test that produces 
 
 181.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that 
in the allocation of authority between shareholders and directors, directors lack the authority 
to decide who serves on the board).  In several other cases, Delaware courts have similarly 
held that the board lacked the power for its desired actions.  See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003) (striking down defensive measures 
that lacked a fiduciary out for directors); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., 
Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 86-87 (Del. Ch.), aff’d on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. 
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (deeming poison pill invalid because pill stripped board 
of its general management authority for a given period of time); cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (holding that a shareholder bylaw that had 
no fiduciary out to requirement that board must reimburse proxy expenses under certain 
conditions exceeded permissible parameters for bylaws). 
 182.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
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an inevitable outcome.  As the Delaware Court of Chancery in Mercier 
reasoned: 
The great strength of Blasius . . . came along with some 
overbroad language that rendered the standard of review 
articulated in the case too crude a tool for regular 
employment. . . . [T]he trigger for the test’s application . . . is so 
pejorative that it is more a label for a result than a useful guide to 
determining what standard of review should be used by a judge to 
reach an appropriate result.
183
 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court of Chancery explained that it would 
use the equitable power invoked in Blasius “sparingly, and only in 
circumstances in which self-interested or faithless fiduciaries act to deprive 
stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the matter [to be 
voted on] and to thwart what appears to be the will of a majority of the 
stockholders.”
184
 
Thus far, only five cases, four by the Delaware Court of Chancery and 
one by the Delaware Supreme Court, have triggered the Blasius test,
185
 and, 
at best, only one passed.
186
  The small number of cases under Blasius 
 
 183.  Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 805–06 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 184.  In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 185.  MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (invalidating 
bylaw amendment that expanded the size of Liquid Audio’s board because of lack of 
compelling justification under Blasius); Mercier, 929 A.2d 786 (finding that a special 
committee had a compelling justification under Blasius for postponing a shareholder vote on 
a merger that independent directors believed was in the best interests of shareholders); 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (striking down a supermajority 
bylaw amendment because it interfered with a shareholder vote and lacked a compelling 
justification under Blasius); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., C.A. No. 17637, 
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (denying a motion for summary judgment 
because of the applicability of Blasius to the board’s decision to adjourn a shareholder 
meeting); Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding a 
cognizable Blasius claim regarding a “dead hand” provision because of the provision’s 
effect on shareholders’ ability to elect a board that would accept a takeover offer). 
 186.  The one case that arguably passed the Blasius test was Mercier.  In Mercier, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery criticized Blasius, contending that once the test was triggered, 
no board could ever successfully offer a compelling purpose for purposefully 
disenfranchising its shareholders.  929 A.2d at 806.  The Mercier court thus concluded that 
Blasius was not a test at all, since it could never be passed.  Id.  The Mercier court 
contended that the board’s conduct should be reviewed through a modified Unocal test.  Id. 
at 810–11.  After showing how such a modified Unocal review would work in this context, 
and after finding that the target board would pass Unocal because it acted in good faith to 
preserve a value-maximizing offer, the Mercier court returned to the Blasius test.  The court 
concluded that since it had no authority to overrule the Blasius test, which the Delaware 
Supreme Court had affirmed in MM Cos., the Inter-Tel board’s conduct would have to be 
filtered through the Blasius test.  Id. at 813.  The Mercier court held that the board had a 
compelling justification for its conduct and therefore successfully met the Blasius test.  Id. at 
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indicates the courts’ reluctance to invoke a test that is impossible—or 
nearly so—for boards to pass.
187
 
Similarly, when a court invokes the Schnell doctrine, the judge cannot 
rely on any monitor to decide that the board’s conduct is both legal and 
inequitable.  Moreover, the consequence of a board failing Schnell is that 
the judge will exercise its equitable powers.  Like Blasius, courts will 
invoke the Schnell doctrine sparingly, but for reasons that differ from the 
infrequent use of Blasius.  The Schnell doctrine allows courts, without 
boundaries or guideposts, to invalidate otherwise legal conduct.
188
  Thus, 
the Delaware Supreme Court has warned courts that a capacious use of the 
Schnell doctrine could “imperil[]” the stability of Delaware law.
189
  
Delaware courts have responded to this warning.  Despite its forty-plus 
year history,
190
 and its facial applicability to any aspect of corporate law, 
Delaware courts have applied the Schnell doctrine only thirteen times
191
 
 
819; cf. Peerless, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *54 (finding that Blasius applied and 
expressing doubt that the defendants could provide a compelling justification for their 
conduct, but refusing to resolve that issue in a motion for summary judgment). 
 187.  See, e.g., Mercier, 929 A.2d at 805–06 (“The great strength of Blasius . . . came 
along with some overbroad language that rendered the standard of review articulated in the 
case too crude a tool for regular employment.”); In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 
C.A. No. 20269, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *42 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (“[I]t is unlikely, 
if not impossible, for a defendant to meet this burden on a motion to dismiss.”). 
 188.  See Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 86, 
95–96 (2009) (suggesting that Schnell be limited to voting cases because it could potentially 
invalidate any type of conduct on equitable grounds). 
 189.  Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991); see also 
Accipiter Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 127 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to 
apply Schnell because that doctrine should be used only “where compelling circumstances 
suggest that the company unfairly manipulated the voting process in such a serious way as 
to constitute an evident or grave incursion on the fabric of the corporate law”); Mary Siegel, 
Going Private: Three Doctrines Gone Astray, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 399, 419–22 (2008) 
(suggesting that Schnell be limited to “cases involving voting mechanics”); Siegel, supra 
note 188, at 93–96 (noting problems with the boundless nature of the Schnell doctrine as 
well as its enabling of judges becoming “super-legislators”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate 
Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances In Which It Is Equitable To Take 
That Action: The Implicit Corollary To The Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 
877 (2005) (noting the danger that courts will forget to respect the law side of the law-equity 
divide in exercising their equitable powers). 
 190.  Schnell was decided in 1971. 
 191.  Only thirteen Delaware cases (plus Schnell itself) involved a true Schnell analysis.  
See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (finding Schnell violation 
because of agreement between shareholder and incumbent board which involved retaining 
the board in exchange for adding a seat to be filled by the shareholder’s designee); Accipiter 
Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to invalidate action 
taken at annual meeting under Schnell because the action at issue was not sufficiently 
extraordinary to meet the Schnell standard); Hollinger Int’l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080–
81 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005) (holding Schnell applicable to bylaw 
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after Schnell was decided, and all but two of these cases
192
 involved some 
aspect of shareholder voting rights. 
Thus, while Blasius and Schnell mandate judicial review, the 
justification for applying either of these doctrines is unique.  Although 
there are no monitors to use in either of these tests, courts have made the 
 
amendments and then striking down those bylaw amendments as inequitable); Linton v. 
Everett, C.A. No. 15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (finding a 
Schnell violation where shareholders were given insufficient notice of a stockholder meeting 
to be able to nominate opposing directors); Dolgoff v. Projectavision, Inc., C.A. No. 1168, 
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996) (refusing to grant preliminary 
injunction to delay a board meeting that “may have caught Mr. Dolgoff by surprise, 
arguably handicapping his ability to mount a counter-proxy campaign” because this was not 
sufficient to satisfy the Schnell test); Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., C.A. 
No. 11779, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (finding Schnell violation 
where enforcement of bylaw would have led to incumbent board running unopposed in 
election); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) (declining to find a 
Schnell violation where the board decided to hold an annual shareholder meeting later than 
it had originally intended to in order to explore alternatives to a hostile tender offer); 
Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., C.A. No. 10307, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
13, 1989) (refusing to dismiss a complaint regarding delisting of shares and nonpayment of 
dividends despite a lack of impropriety because of the potential for equitable relief under 
Schnell); Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding a Schnell 
violation where directors postponed a meeting at which they would likely not have been re-
elected); Packer v. Yampol, C.A. No. 8432, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 
1986) (finding a Schnell violation where issuance of new stock would have the effect of 
perpetuating directors in office); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407–08 
(Del. 1985) (finding under Schnell that the board’s funding of an ESOP was inequitable as 
the dilutive issuance had the “primary purpose of perpetuating . . . control” and 
disenfranchising shareholders); Huffington v. Enstar Corp., C.A. No. 7543, 1984 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 492 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1984) (finding no Schnell violation where directors changed 
date of the annual stockholder meeting in order to facilitate the sale of the company); 
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (striking down a bylaw 
amendment enacted because of plaintiff’s intent to wage a proxy contest as inequitable 
under Schnell).  However, Delaware courts have cited to Schnell in a variety of contexts 
without going on to apply the doctrine, perhaps to remind corporations that the court has a 
trump card with which it could invalidate inequitable conduct.  See, e.g., Del. Ins. Guar. 
Ass’n v. Christiana Care Health Servs., 892 A.2d 1073, 1078 n.20 (Del. 2006) (citing, in an 
insurance dispute,Schnell’s general rule that legal action is not necessarily equitable); In re 
Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *28 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (citing Schnell where stockholders wished to enjoin a vote on a merger 
until after their challenges to the merger had been resolved); Smith v. SPNV Holdings, Inc., 
C.A. Nos. 8395, 8080, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 505, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 1987) (citing 
Schnell to support that “[u]nfair dealing by a controlling shareholder is not permitted 
regardless of the action’s legality”). 
 192.  The two cases that did not relate to shareholder voting were Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 
1022 (striking down as inequitable bylaw amendments that dismantled a special committee 
which was created to evaluate a transaction), and Seagraves, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155, at 
*11-12 (noting the potential for relief under Schnell regarding the delisting of shares and the 
nonpayment of dividends). 
SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2013  4:15 PM 
646 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
hurdle to triggering either of these tests so high that the two tests are rarely 
used. 
 
E. Summary 
Delaware courts have relied heavily on the independent directors in 
the Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness tests.  In Revlon and entire fairness, 
Delaware courts have also added the monitors of disinterested shares and 
the market monitor, which plays a focal role in Revlon.  Equally significant 
is that Delaware courts are increasingly embracing these external monitors, 
preferring decisions by independent directors and disinterested shares over 
judicial review of the entire fairness of controlling-shareholder 
transactions.  Finally, Blasius and Schnell remain tests that are subject 
solely to judicial review, but invocation of either test is a rarity. 
 
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE EXTERNAL MONITORS 
The previous section demonstrated that lurking beneath the veneer of 
judicial review are three prevalent monitors:  independent directors, 
disinterested shares, and the market.
193
  As noted above,
194
 judicial review 
under Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness relies heavily on independent 
directors.  In addition, courts applying both the Revlon and entire fairness 
tests added a reliance on the shareholder monitor.  Finally, Revlon also 
relies heavily on the market monitor.  While judicial reliance on these 
external monitors has not always been explicit, there is little doubt that 
these external monitors have heavily impacted Delaware court decisions.  
Each external monitor, however, has its strengths and weaknesses, or at 
least, its supporters and detractors. 
Those who support trusting independent directors have one main 
argument:  While concerns may exist relating to entrenchment motives or 
 
 193.  When appraisal rights are available, some courts consider this right as an added 
monitor.  See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys.  v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1192 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that although “serious questions” about the Caremark board’s 
merger negotiations existed, “the ability of shareholders to vote in a fully-informed fashion, 
and the availability of appraisal rights to any shareholders that may be dissatisfied with the 
merger consideration shape the appropriate limits of judicial intervention”).  In Delaware, 
however, shareholders do not often have appraisal rights, as mergers are the only transaction 
that offers these rights, which will nevertheless be denied if the market-out exception 
applies.  See infra note 216 (discussing market-out exception to appraisal rights). 
 194.  See supra Part II.E. 
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structural bias for inside directors,
195
 approval by independent directors 
“has the effect of placing the board’s decision-making function into 
impartial hands.”
196
  In Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc., the 
Delaware Court of Chancery explained: 
Where decisions are made by outside independent directors 
instead of members of management who have a presumptive 
desire to retain their employment, the concern that the board’s 
decisions are tainted by self-serving motives is mitigated, and 
there naturally follows a greater presumption of good faith and 
reasonable investigation.
197
 
Indeed, courts
198
 and Congress
199
 alike have assumed that an independent 
board is the best tool for monitoring corporate management.  As one 
scholar wrote, “[t]he independent director has always held a special place 
in the hearts and minds of corporate lawmakers as an idealized monitor of 
executives’ behavior.”
200
 
 
 195.  Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002) (noting 
that “an insider-dominated board is seen as a device for management entrenchment”); 
William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional 
Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1999) (noting that conventional wisdom holds that 
inside directors are more likely to take self-interested actions than are independent 
directors); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You 
Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 19 
(2003) (noting that the traditional distinction between inside directors and outside directors 
is sensible because inside directors often have personal interests that are adverse to the 
firm). 
 196.  Clark W. Furlow, Back to Basics: Harmonizing Delaware’s Law Governing Going 
Private Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 85, 98 (2007). 
 197.  Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
39, at *51 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010). 
 198.  See supra note 9 (explaining that courts will defer to independent and well-
informed directors under the business judgment rule); supra notes 88–89 (stating that courts 
will give deference to independent boards under Unocal); supra note 113 and accompanying 
text (stating courts will defer to independent directors under Revlon) 
 199.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (directing the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to undertake rulemaking, including mandatory listing 
standards for self-regulatory organizations, and subsequent enactment of rules by the New 
York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
requiring all listed companies to have boards consisting of a majority of independent 
directors); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, ,Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–94 (2010) (requiring the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to issue further rules directing the exchanges to require independent 
compensation committees). 
 200.  Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1175, 1175 (2011).  For a discussion of whether independent boards are more effective 
managers, see Bhagat & Black, supra note 195 (finding little difference in performance 
among firms that have independent boards versus those that do not). 
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On the other hand, critics of trusting directors are suspicious that even 
those who legally qualify as independent
201
 may not actually be free from 
bias:  “Independent directors traditionally were nominated by insiders and, 
in any event, generally are selected from the business community to ensure 
that they will have adequate expertise.  Because of structural bias, it may be 
difficult for them to criticize either their fellow directors or the officers of 
the corporation.”
202
  Along the same lines, another commentator reasoned, 
“[d]isinterested directors may not have a financial interest in the transaction 
in question, but they may nevertheless be conflicted with respect to the 
decision itself, if only because of its effect on a colleague.”
203
 
Thus, supporters and opponents offer different views on whether 
legally-qualified independent directors are truly free of structural bias.  
Delaware courts, by choosing to rely on independent directors, have taken a 
leap of faith that independent directors will make independent decisions.  
The discussion above analyzing Unocal and Revlon cases in which a few 
independent boards nevertheless failed to meet their respective duties
204
 
demonstrates, however, that the Delaware courts’ faith in independent 
directors goes only so far; these Unocal and Revlon failures reveal that 
Delaware courts are attuned to the possibility of nominally independent 
boards acting passively and subserviently to management’s desires.  It is 
impossible to conjecture about the extent to which Delaware’s “trust but 
verify” approach sufficiently satisfies ardent believers in structural bias. 
In contrast to the singular point of dispute about the efficacy of the 
independent-director monitor, those who support disinterested share 
approval offer three main arguments.  One contention is that any self-
 
 201.  See supra note 6 (defining independent director). 
 202.  Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 460 
(2008); see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1448–49 (2011) (arguing that because there are practical and 
psychological limitations on independence, it is questionable whether even outside directors 
can be independent from the CEO); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good 
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 838 (2007) (explaining that even outside 
directors will want to protect against hostile takeovers in order to protect their board 
positions and may also be “motivated by the ‘pernicious golden rule’ to defer to those 
whose deference they would want as officers . . . . thus mak[ing] decisions that favor those 
officers and themselves even if doing so is not the best course for the corporation as a 
whole”). 
 203.  Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 821, 842 (2004); see also William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 
1308 (2000) (recognizing concerns that an independent committee may not be truly 
independent as they are “not hermetically sealed off from the inside directors”). 
 204.  See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (discussing cases where 
independent boards failed the Unocal test); supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text 
(discussing cases where independent boards failed the Revlon test). 
SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2013  4:15 PM 
2013] THE ILLUSION OF ENHANCED REVIEW 649 
 
dealing is effectively eliminated when the minority shares have the power 
to refuse the transaction.
205
  Second, the shareholder vote provides an 
objective monitor of the transaction, rather than a court’s subjective view 
of whether the transaction is fair or whether the directors were properly 
motivated.
206
  Finally, such approval lets shareholders make their own 
investment decisions instead of a court deciding whether the deal 
recommended by the board is fair.  As the court in Louisiana Municipal 
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford stated, “[o]nly in 
extraordinary circumstances will this Court . . . usurp the rights of 
shareholders to make their own informed decisions.”
207
 
On the other hand, some contest the efficacy of disinterested 
shareholder approval on the theory that shareholders may simply 
rubberstamp management’s recommendations.
208
  Others contend that 
shareholders are not able to evaluate the terms of the transaction and have 
no viable option if they reject the deal.
209
  These issues are accentuated in a 
 
 205.  See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 413–14 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(explaining that in In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 957 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
[Revlon II], because the majority of the minority shares twice rejected the deal proposed by 
the controlling shareholder, shareholders had been able to thwart management’s self-
dealing); id. (noting that in In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 83 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001), minority shares rebuffed controlling-shareholder’s 
exchange offer and thus effectively combated the controller’s efforts to self-deal). 
 206.  See Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 
HASTINGS L.J. 377, 407–08 (1985) (“[A] fair vote of shareholders is an objective criterion 
that replaces judicial evaluation of management’s motives.”). 
 207.  918 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. 
Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010) (“[S]tockholders with economic ownership are 
expressing their collective view as to whether a particular course of action serves the 
corporate goal of stockholder wealth maximization.”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007) (refusing to “enjoin the only deal on the table, 
when the stockholders can make that decision themselves.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders 
Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[C]orporate law should not be designed on the 
assumption that diversified investors are infirm but instead should give great deference to 
transactions approved by them voluntarily and knowledgeably.”); see also Allen et al., 
supra note 2, at 1308 (reasoning that if the shareholder vote is uncoerced and is fully 
informed, the shareholder vote should be dispositive, especially given the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s “rightful emphasis on the importance of the shareholder franchise and its 
exercise”). 
 208.  See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 676-77 (1981) (“[S]hareholders often behave like sheep when asked 
to vote on a transaction, and support docilely any recommendation management makes.”). 
 209.  See Bevis Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983, at 14 (noting that shareholders may not be in a position to evaluate 
transaction and often do not have realistic alternatives to approval); see, e.g., Kahn I, 638 
A.2d at 1116–17 (noting the concern that minority shareholder rights could be lost due to 
intended or unintended coercion by the majority); In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. 
No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (holding that minority 
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controlling-shareholder transaction, where concerns about “the potential for 
process manipulation by the controlling stockholder, and the concern that 
the controlling stockholder’s continued presence might influence even a 
fully informed shareholder vote”
210
 may leave opponents uneasy.  Those 
who share these concerns may derive comfort from the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s insistence in Kahn v. Lynch on reviewing all controlling-
shareholder mergers under the entire fairness standard
211
 or on the ability of 
the court to discount the shareholder vote by finding that defendants did not 
make a full disclosure.
212
 
Finally, Delaware courts have relied on a market monitor in a variety 
of contexts,
213
 but the transaction market is the one relevant for our 
purposes.  In order for directors to fulfill their Revlon duties, “[m]arket 
forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders 
the best price available for their equity.”
214
  Proponents of the market 
 
shareholders may improperly lose their legal status as shareholders where they are not 
realistically given a choice, and are forced to accept the terms of the offer); In re Pure Res., 
Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the threat that controlling 
stockholders may coerce minority stockholders who could, essentially, be forced to accept 
the offered terms); In re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1075–76 (Del. Ch. 
2001) (holding that the plaintiffs, who tendered their shares after a merger was 
consummated, “did not do so voluntarily,” so as to acquiesce to the merger and forfeit any 
claims, because they were not given a “meaningful choice” when they were faced with a 
choice between “accepting the possibly inadequate merger consideration and pursuing a 
possibly inadequate appraisal remedy”). 
 210.  In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1205 (Del. Ch. 
1995); see also In re JCC Holding Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 843 A.2d 713, 723 (Del. Ch. 
2003) (“[I]nherent coercion is thought to undermine the fairness-guaranteeing effect of a 
majority-of-the-minority vote condition because coerced fear or a hopeless acceptance of a 
dominant power’s will, rather than rational self-interest, is deemed likely to be the 
animating force behind the minority’s decision to approve the merger.”). 
 211.  See infra note 270 and accompanying text.  For a contrary view, see infra notes 
292–300 and accompanying text (identifying cases criticizing Kahn’s holding that entire 
fairness must remain the standard of review in all controlling-shareholder mergers, and 
therefore finding ways to distinguish cases from Kahn). 
 212.  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (negating 
shareholder vote on grounds that “the Board’s lack of valuation information should have 
been disclosed”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (negating the 
effect of a shareholder vote because the controlling shareholder failed to disclose to 
shareholders the details of a feasibility study it prepared with the help of some target 
directors). 
 213.  See, e.g., Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002) (finding market 
price relevant in a reverse-stock split); Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046, 
1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) (finding market price relevant in sale of 
corporation); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (finding market price as the sole determinative factor in appraisal proceeding). 
 214.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 
1986); see also supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text (discussing importance of 
SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2013  4:15 PM 
2013] THE ILLUSION OF ENHANCED REVIEW 651 
 
monitor offer one major argument: under the right conditions, the market 
will offer fair value.  As then-Vice Chancellor, and now Justice Jacobs, 
explained: 
The most persuasive evidence of the fairness of the . . . merger 
price is that it was the result of arm’s-length negotiations 
between two independent parties, where the seller . . . was 
motivated to seek the highest available price, and a diligent and 
extensive canvass of the market had confirmed that no better 
price was available . . . . The fact that a transaction price was 
forged in the crucible of objective market reality (as 
distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of 
a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is 
fair.
215
 
Rather than voicing a generic objection to the fairness of the 
transaction market, critics instead focus on conditions when that market 
might not offer fair value.
216
  The main concern surfaces when the 
 
market check in Revlon test). 
 215.  Unimation, 1991 WL 29303, at *17; see also M.P.M. Enters., Inc., v. Gilbert, 731 
A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where 
there are no claims of collusion is a very strong indication of fair value.”). 
 216.  In contrast to the transaction market, the inherent reliability of the stock market 
price is more contentious and has surfaced specifically in the context of whether there 
should be a market-out exception to appraisal rights.  Thirty-six states have adopted a 
market-out exception on the theory that, since the market offers fair value, there is no need 
for the judicially-determined valuation that appraisal rights offer.  See Mary Siegel, An 
Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 LAW 
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 246 n.75, 248 n.88 (2011) (listing states with market-out 
exceptions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2001) (denying appraisal rights if there is a 
publicly-traded market); see also tit. 8, §§ 262(b)(2), (b)(3) (restoring appraisal rights under 
certain conditions despite market-out exception).  Concerns about the reliability of the 
market price if the market is illiquid or if the transaction is a conflict transaction caused the 
authors of the Model Act’s statutory appraisal provisions to limit the Act’s market-out 
exception to those situations where the market is sufficiently liquid and the transaction is not 
an interested transaction.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.02(b)(1), (b)(4) (2010) (listing 
requirements for liquidity and conflict-of-interest, respectively).  For a discussion of the 
MBCA’s market-out exception, see Siegel, supra, at 245–56.  Eleven states have thus far 
adopted the Model Act’s limits on the market-out exception.  See id. at 248 nn.91–92 
(listing states that limit the market-out to a liquid market and a non-conflict transaction).  
Fourteen states have no market-out exception at all.  Id. at 246 n.76, 248 n.88.  When 
appraisal rights are available in Delaware, Delaware courts begin the evaluation with a 
strong belief that the stock market offers reliable evidence of fair value.  See, e.g., 
Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 889–90 (relying on the average of the market price over a ten-day 
period preceding the proposed transaction to determine the fair value that corporation owed 
to those shareholders who were to be cashed out in a reverse stock-split, noting, “our 
jurisprudence recognizes that in many circumstances a property interest is best valued by the 
amount a buyer will pay for it.  The Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that a well-
informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate 
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controlling shareholder or insiders can taint the transaction market.  For 
example, an offer by a third party that is inadequate will likely be met with 
competing bids, but a similar transaction by a controlling shareholder will 
not.
217
  Finally, questions also may arise whether bids by insiders, even if 
not controlling shareholders, have enough of an “inside track” to similarly 
distort the market.  As the Delaware Supreme Court in Applebaum v. 
Avaya, Inc. reasoned: 
When a controlling stockholder presents a transaction that will 
free it from future dealings with the minority stockholders, 
opportunism becomes a concern.  Any shortfall imposed on the 
minority stockholders will result in a transfer of value to the 
controlling stockholder.  The discount in value could be imposed 
deliberately or could be the result of an information asymmetry 
where the controlling stockholder possesses material facts that 
are not known in the market.
218
 
Delaware courts have met these concerns about the market by 
strengthening procedural protections to thwart the otherwise unbridled 
power of controlling shareholders.
219
 
Despite arguments for and against the three external monitors, 
Delaware courts have developed a broad trust in them, with some fine-
tuning.  Delaware courts have calibrated their reliance on independent 
directors by delving below the label of independence until courts are 
satisfied that these directors have effectively represented their shareholders 
and explored the relevant market; established procedures to assure that the 
shareholder vote is both informed and voluntary; and required boards to get 
reliable, objective, market information.  This Article now examines a few 
 
the court could impose”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 847 A.2d 340 (using market price 
as the only factor in appraisal proceeding).  The Delaware Supreme Court will qualify its 
confidence in the market price if the stock is not actively traded or the transaction is an 
insider transaction.  Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 891 n.38 (noting that market price might 
satisfy the fair value requirement but not where the market price was set by the issuer 
company, acting as the primary (if not the sole) buyer); see also Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc., 
902 A.2d 1130, 1154 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that a thinly traded, illiquid market does not 
produce a fair price).  One final issue is that, in Delaware, the stock value for appraisal 
purposes will not include any minority discount, Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 
1137, 1141 (Del. 1989), while the market price will reflect the value of a minority position.  
In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Litig., C.A. Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS, 2008 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *116 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (noting that the trading price “was a 
minority value . . . . a rational market price would not attribute anything but a trivial value to 
the voting rights attached to the [minority] shares”). 
 217.  See supra note 210 (explaining concern that shareholders feel pressured to take the 
deal offered by the controlling shareholder). 
 218.  812 A.2d at 891. 
 219.  See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
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“outlier cases” in which Delaware courts trusted only themselves despite 
the availability of one or more external monitors. 
 
IV. A FEW OUTLIERS 
Thus far, this Article has both demonstrated that Delaware courts 
typically avoid judicial review when the external monitors are available 
and identified the relevant refinements to each monitor.  This section will 
discuss some “outlier” cases, namely those where a Delaware court went 
out of its way to engage in judicial review despite the availability of one or 
more of the monitors in their purest and best form.  This section offers as 
outlier examples two decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court:  Omnicare 
v. NCS and Kahn v. Lynch.
220
  This section both explains the court’s 
reasoning for trusting only itself and illustrates that the cost accompanying 
such judicial intervention has been decisions that even Delaware courts 
find questionable. 
 
A. Unocal Test: Omnicare 
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.
221
 is an outlier case, because 
the Delaware Supreme Court had all external monitors in play and instead 
chose to disregard them.  The facts are not in dispute.  When NCS 
Corporation was near bankruptcy, it explored strategic alternatives.  While 
two corporations, Omnicare, Inc. and Genesis Health Ventures, expressed 
interest in purchasing NCS, both suitors were problematic:  Omnicare 
would not to commit to a deal during the pendency of NCS’ search process, 
and Genesis refused to proceed unless it had an exclusivity agreement and 
a lock-up in any potential deal.
222
  Ultimately, the NCS board decided that 
“balancing the potential loss of the Genesis deal against the uncertainty of 
Omnicare’s letter, results in the conclusion that the only reasonable 
 
 220.  See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (disregarding, under the 
business judgment rule, the decision of an independent board, the shareholder vote, and the 
market because once the court found the board to be grossly negligent, the court reasoned 
that this negligence negatively infected the disclosure to shareholders that provided the basis 
for their vote and did not allow the board to adequately assess market information); Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (giving the Court of Chancery the option to 
disregard the decision of an independent committee that fulfilled its fiduciary duties and 
instead substitute the Court of Chancery’s own business judgment on whether a derivative 
suit should proceed). 
 221.  818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 222.  Id. at 921. 
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alternative for the Board of Directors is to approve the Genesis 
transaction.”
223
  The NCS board therefore approved a two-part plan that 
guaranteed the approval of the Genesis merger:  The board would commit 
to recommend the Genesis transaction to the NCS shareholders without a 
fiduciary-out clause,
224
 and the majority shareholders—who were also 
officers and directors of NCS
225
—agreed to sign voting agreements to vote 
their shares in favor of the Genesis merger.
226
  Shortly after NCS executed 
these agreements, Omnicare presented NCS with a proposal that was more 
favorable to the NCS shareholders,
227
 and the NCS board withdrew its 
recommendation to the NCS shareholders endorsing the Genesis merger.
228
  
The board’s withdrawal of its recommendation, however, was purely 
cosmetic, as the Genesis deal had previously secured the requisite board 
recommendation and shareholder vote.
229
 
Omnicare and some NCS minority shareholders sued to enjoin the 
merger, claiming that the deal-protection devices in the NCS-Genesis 
merger agreement violated the NCS board’s fiduciary duties because the 
agreement did not allow for the board to back out of the deal if a superior 
transaction—such as Omnicare’s—emerged in the future.
230
  When the 
Court of Chancery denied the request for an injunction, the case went to the 
Delaware Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal.
231
  In a divided 
opinion,
232
 the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the 
 
 223.  Id. at 925.  Omnicare’s letter to NCS was uncertain because it “was expressly 
conditioned on negotiating a merger agreement, obtaining certain third party consents, and 
completing its due diligence.”  Id. at 924. 
 224.  Id. at 925.  A fiduciary-out clause is a “contractual provision . . . that would permit 
the board of the corporation being acquired to exit without breaching the merger agreement 
in the event of a superior offer.”  Id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). 
 225.  One was the Chairman of the NCS board of directors, and the other was the 
President, CEO and a director of NCS.  Id. at 919–20. 
 226.  Id. at 925. 
 227.  Id. at 926. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  See supra notes 224, 226 and accompanying text.  The NCS directors were aware 
that they had irrevocably bound themselves to the Genesis deal, as NCS’ legal counsel had 
advised the board that this deal “would prevent NCS from engaging in any alternative or 
superior transaction in the future.”  Id. at 924. 
 230.  Plaintiffs filed the fiduciary duty claim in In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders 
Litig., 825 A.2d 240 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 231.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934.  The Delaware Court of Chancery denied the request 
for a preliminary injunction in an order dated November 22, 2002, which it revised on 
November 25, 2002.  See In re NCS Healthcare, 825 A.2d at 263 (in which the preliminary 
injunction request was denied).  The interlocutory review was in Appeal No. 649, 2002.  See 
Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920 (relating the procedural history of the case at hand). 
 232.  The en banc Supreme Court was divided in a 3-2 decision.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d 
914. 
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defensive measures of the merger agreement under the Unocal standard
233
 
and held that the deal-protection measures violated Unocal’s second step 
since the measures were both preclusive and coercive because no other 
proposal could succeed.
234
  The majority held “alternatively”
235
 that the 
NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary-out clause:  
“Notwithstanding the corporation’s insolvent condition, the NCS board had 
no authority to execute a merger agreement that subsequently prevented it 
from effectively discharging its ongoing fiduciary responsibilities.”
236
 
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court 
chose to ignore all monitors.  After the Court of Chancery
237
 and all five 
justices of the Delaware Supreme Court conceded that the NCS board was 
independent and well informed,
238
 one would expect the majority to defer 
to this board.
239
  The majority, however, gave two reasons to proceed 
 
 233.  It is questionable whether this case should have been governed by Unocal.  
Traditionally, a third-party merger is governed by the business judgment rule.  See supra 
notes 24–25 (noting that the business judgment rule applies to a merger in which there is no 
conflict of interest).  In Omnicare, however, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court 
decided that since the lock-up defended NCS, Unocal was applicable.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court ignored that the reason Unocal 
requires enhanced business judgment review is because target directors face an inherent 
conflict of interest if they defend the corporation from being taken over by a hostile offeror; 
the court failed to square that logic with its concession that the NCS directors had no 
conflict of any kind in their desire to sell the corporation.  Moreover, the board’s enactment 
of deal-protection devices was not defensive, but rather proactive, in order to lure Genesis 
into a deal.  See id. at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting it is “debatable whether Unocal 
applies—and we believe that the better rule in this situation is that the business judgment 
rule should apply”); Id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) (stating, “[i]n my opinion, Delaware 
law mandates deference under the business judgment rule to a board of directors’ decision 
that is free from self interest, made with due care and in good faith”).  Cf. Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply Unocal to the board’s decision 
not to pursue a merger opportunity because there was no hostile tender offer or other action 
by which court could infer that board acted defensively). 
 234.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 938. 
 237.  Id. at 925 (noting that “the Court of Chancery determined the minutes reflect that 
the directors were fully informed of all material facts relating to the proposed transaction”); 
see also id. at 943 (“The overall quality of testimony given by the NCS directors is among 
the strongest this court has ever seen.  All four NCS directors were deposed, and each 
deposition makes manifest the care and attention given to this project by every member of 
the board.”); In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 260 & n.46 (Del. 
Ch. 2002). 
 238.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940–41 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
opinion adopted the Court of Chancery’s findings that the NCS board fulfilled all of its 
fiduciary duties, with dissent noting that “this conclusion is indisputable on this record”). 
 239.  Id. at 949 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the absence of a suggestion of self-
interest or lack of care compels a court to defer to what is a business judgment that a court is 
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otherwise.  First, the majority reasoned that the board’s conduct was both 
preclusive and coercive.
240
  This conclusion, however, did not comport with 
its prior holdings that board conduct is draconian only when the board 
coerces the shareholder vote;
241
 no one coerced the NCS controlling 
shareholders to execute a voting agreement.  Recall that the controlling 
shareholders were officers and directors of NCS and thus heavily involved 
in the sale of the company; it was their judgment that a sale to Genesis was 
the only viable transaction.  Thus, the majority failed to defer to a 
concededly independent and diligent board for an erroneous reason.  
Second, the court held it could not defer to this board because their 
agreement lacked a fiduciary out.
242
  This logic, in essence, did not fault 
this particular board’s conduct, but instead announced a new rule of law:  
There must always be a fiduciary out.  While one can debate the wisdom of 
this rule,
243
 an opinion based solely on this new requirement would have at 
least continued the courts’ tradition of deferring to the judgment of 
independent and informed directors while faulting this board only for not 
complying with a yet-to-be announced rule of law. 
Only the most favorable view of the majority’s opinion would agree 
with the latter reason for not deferring to the NCS board.  The court’s logic 
for not deferring to the other two monitors, however, has no support.  There 
simply is not a better case for trusting the shareholder vote.  That vote was 
effectively the decision of the majority shareholders to execute the voting 
agreement with Genesis.  These shareholders, as officers and directors, 
were informed; they chose to commit to the merger agreement not because 
the board coerced them or tricked them with misleading disclosure, but 
solely because their judgment was that a sure deal with Genesis was 
 
not qualified to second guess.”). 
 240.  Id. at 936. 
 241.  See id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting that majority incorrectly applied 
law regarding a board coercing its stockholders to case at hand, where board took no such 
action). 
 242.  Id. at 925. 
 243.  See, e.g., id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (commenting on the majority’s 
holding that a per se rule requiring a fiduciary out is necessary, and noting “[w]e know of no 
authority in our jurisprudence supporting this new rule, and we believe it is unwise and 
unwarranted”); id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“I would not shame the NCS board, which 
acted in accordance with every fine instinct that we wish to encourage, by invalidating their 
action approving the Genesis merger because they failed to insist upon a fiduciary out.  I use 
‘shame’ here because the majority finds no breach of loyalty or care but nonetheless 
sanctions these directors for their failure to insist upon a fiduciary out as if those directors 
had no regard for the effect of their otherwise disinterested, careful decision on others.”); 
see also infra notes 255–60 and accompanying text (describing cases that have rejected a 
per se requirement for a fiduciary out in a merger agreement). 
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preferable to a better deal that might or might not eventuate in the future.
244
  
Thus, unlike cases where courts invalidated the shareholder vote due to the 
board’s defective disclosure,
245
 there cannot be any claim that these 
controlling shareholders did not have all the facts.  Moreover, the 
controlling shareholders obviously had the most at stake financially since 
collectively, they owned the majority of shares, and the deal gave both the 
majority and the unaffiliated shares the same consideration.  As such, they 
had no conflict of interest.  Thus, the minority votes were meaningless, not 
because of improper board conduct or faulty disclosure, but because the 
minority shares lacked the power to stop the controlling shareholders from 
exercising their votes as they wished.
246
  Nor was there any finding that the 
minority shares, which need information in order to exercise their appraisal 
rights, were not given full and fair information.  As a result, the court 
should have deferred to the shareholder vote, and the minority’s 
disagreement, if any, should have been remedied solely through their 
appraisal rights. 
Similarly, Omnicare is as compelling a case for deference to the 
market monitor as is possible.  There was no reason for the court to distrust 
this market.  This was not a conflict transaction.  The NCS directors and 
controlling shareholders had no agenda other than what was best for NCS.  
The board did a thorough and careful market search.
247
  Search periods 
 
 244.  Id. at 944 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that the controlling shareholders 
“were fully informed stockholders.  As the NCS controlling stockholders, they made an 
informed choice to commit their voting power to the merger”). 
 245.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (invalidating the shareholder vote on grounds that the 
board’s gross negligence negatively affected its disclosure to the shareholders); supra note 
156 and accompanying text (noting that the court in Weinberger invalidated the shareholder 
vote because the board had not made a full disclosure to the minority shares who had veto 
power over the deal). 
 246.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944–45 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“The minority 
stockholders were deemed to know that when controlling stockholders have 65% of the vote 
they can approve a merger without the need for the minority votes. . . . to the extent a 
minority stockholder may have felt ‘coerced’ to vote for the merger, which was already a 
fait accompli, it was a meaningless coercion—or no coercion at all—because the controlling 
votes . . . were already ‘cast.’ . . . there was no meaningful minority stockholder voting 
decision to coerce.”); see also Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc., Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 9212, 
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990) (reasoning that “a shareholder, 
even a majority shareholder, has discretion as to when to sell his stock and to whom”). 
 247.  The undisputed facts reveal that NCS began to explore its options in February of 
2000 by retaining a financial advisor that contacted over fifty entities.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d 
at 920.  NCS then hired a different advisor in December of 2000, as NCS’ financial situation 
deteriorated.  Id. at 921.  In the summer of 2001, NCS invited Omnicare to begin 
discussions with NCS’ financial advisor; Omnicare submitted a bid that was unsatisfactory 
to NCS.  Id.  In January, 2002, NCS contacted Genesis about a possible deal, while 
Omnicare pursued secret discussions with one of NCS’ directors.  Id.  In June, 2002, 
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require end dates,
248
 particularly given NCS’ dire financial straits:  It was 
on borrowed time and staring into the abyss of bankruptcy.  Despite the 
NCS board’s repeated efforts to get Omnicare to the table,
249
 the market 
produced only one bid—Genesis’—in the timeframe set by the NCS board.  
As the court in Barkan reasoned, “when it is widely known that some 
change of control is in the offing and no rival bids are forthcoming . . . that 
fact is supportive of the board’s decision to proceed.”
250
  Moreover, the 
majority paid little heed to Genesis’ role and needs:  It was the Genesis 
deal that spurred a higher, concrete offer from Omnicare, but the Genesis 
deal would not have eventuated without the lock-up. 
Given that the facts of Omnicare trip all three monitors and none of 
their exceptions or refinements, it is curious that the majority of the 
Delaware Supreme Court eschewed these monitors in favor of judicial 
review.  The court’s disregard of all of the monitors is inexplicable, save 
for the following telling comment: 
The latitude a board will have in either maintaining or using the 
defensive devices it has adopted to protect the merger it approved 
will vary according to the degree of benefit or detriment to the 
stockholders’ interests that is presented by the value or terms of 
the subsequent competing transaction.
251
 
In other words, the majority’s decision can be explained by its 
frustration that the board was unable to seize the better deal; by 
invalidating the deal-protection devices, the majority of the Delaware 
Supreme Court delivered that better option to the NCS shareholders.  Little 
 
Genesis made a proposal but insisted on an exclusivity agreement.  Id. at 922.  NCS and 
Genesis continued to negotiate the deal through July of 2002, id. at 923, when Omnicare 
resurfaced with a conditional offer.  Id. at 924.  As Justice Steele in dissent reasoned, “the 
NCS board had thoroughly canvassed the market in an attempt to find an acquirer, save the 
company, repay creditors and provide some financial benefit to stockholders.  They did so in 
the face of silence, tepid interest to outright hostility from Omnicare.  The only bona fide, 
credible merger partner NCS could find during an exhaustive process was Genesis.”  Id. at 
947. 
 248.  See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008–12 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (finding board’s decision to accept a deal after an open market check of one year 
produced no capable buyers); see also supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text 
(regarding additional information about Toys “R” Us). 
 249.  The undisputed facts show that NCS reached out to Omnicare in the summer of 
2001, Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921, sent its financial advisor to meet with Omnicare’s 
financial advisor in October of 2001, id., and only in late July of 2002, after Omnicare was 
concerned that NCS was negotiating a deal with an Omnicare competitor, did Omnicare 
present a proposal to NCS that would have been acceptable to NCS had it not been qualified 
by so many conditions.  Id. at 924. 
 250.  Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989). 
 251.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 933 (emphasis added). 
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time, however, need be spent highlighting the obvious:  Courts should not 
second-guess any board’s conduct based on a better offer that subsequently 
emerges.  This is one rationale for the business judgment rule,
252
 and a 
concern quickly blunted after Revlon, where Delaware courts repeatedly 
assured boards that they need not have a crystal ball, nor guarantee that 
they have secured the best bid.
253
  In Omnicare, the majority of the 
Delaware Supreme Court reneged on that promise.  As the Court of 
Chancery in Orman v. Cullman commented on Omnicare, “the test would 
appear to result in judicial invalidation of negotiated contractual provisions 
based on the advantages of hindsight.”
254
 
In sum, all monitors, as well as appraisal rights, were in play in 
Omnicare.  Had the court deferred to the monitors, the majority would have 
decided the case differently.  It is important to underscore, however, that 
rather than a debate of opinions about whether this board breached its 
fiduciary duties, the monitors instead provided concrete facts that would 
have supported a contrary outcome. 
Moreover, the “market” of judicial opinions has decreed that 
Omnicare was wrongly decided.  One California court has squarely held 
that Omnicare is not the law in California,
255
 and the Delaware Court of 
Chancery has openly criticized Omnicare as “an aberrational departure” 
from the traditional view that the critical fact is whether the board acted 
reasonably based on all of the facts and circumstances.
256
  Equally telling is 
that the Delaware Court of Chancery has attempted to dilute Omnicare’s 
effect on Delaware law.  In Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
257
 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held that no fiduciary out was required where 
the board agreed to a merger and the controlling shareholders signed 
written consents approving the merger the day after the board signed the 
agreement, as opposed to before the merger vote, as was the case in 
Omnicare.  The Delaware Court of Chancery distinguished Omnicare by 
 
 252.  Supra note 12 (identifying that one rationale for the business judgment rule is to 
shield directors from liability when a better deal emerges in the future). 
 253.  See supra note 117 (explaining directors can only attempt to get the best bid, and 
will not be liable if a better bid emerges in the future); supra note 126 and accompanying 
text (same). 
 254.  C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *35 n.98 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004); 
see also Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Our jurisprudence 
cannot . . . be seen as turning on such ex post felicitous results.  Rather, the NCS board’s 
good faith decision must be subject to a real-time review of the board action before the 
NCS-Genesis merger agreement was entered into.”). 
 255.  Monty v. Leis, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 641, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied, June 
15, 2011 (“Omnicare has been criticized even by Delaware courts . . . .  We decline to 
follow Omnicare.”). 
 256.  Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1016 n.68 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 257.  No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). 
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reasoning that since the shareholder vote was not part of the merger 
agreement, the transaction was not a certainty.
258
  Similarly, the Court of 
Chancery in Orman v. Cullman
259
 granted defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment in a merger where plaintiff claimed the board breached its 
fiduciary duties.  In reasoning that the board had not locked up a deal, the 
court distinguished its case from Omnicare on two grounds, neither of 
which accurately portrayed that the deal was, realistically, locked up.
260
  
Thus, some opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery range from 
outright criticism of Omnicare to outright evasion of Omnicare’s tentacles. 
 
B. Entire Fairness: Kahn v. Lynch 
Kahn v. Lynch Communication System, Inc.
261
 (Kahn I) is another 
outlier case in that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to disregard two 
monitors:  independent directors and the votes of disinterested shares.  As 
discussed above,
262
 Kahn I involved a shareholder’s suit against his 
corporation, Lynch, which was acquired by Lynch’s controlling 
shareholder, Alcatel U.S.A. Corporation (Alcatel), pursuant to a tender 
offer followed by a cash-out merger.
263
  Plaintiff claimed that Alcatel 
breached its fiduciary duties to Lynch and its shareholders by dictating the 
 
 258.  The Court of Chancery in Openlane was aware that its efforts to distinguish this 
case from Omnicare were razor thin, commenting in a footnote that even though there was 
no shareholder agreement in the case at hand, since board members owned sixty percent of 
the stock, majority approval of the merger the day after the merger agreement was signed 
was a “virtual certainty.”  Id. at *31 n.48.  Furthermore, the Court of Chancery in Openlane 
presented another novel way to cabin Omnicare.  The court in Openlane contended that 
since Omnicare may be read to require a fiduciary out in merger agreements, the world of 
hostile bidders was aware that it could bid for a company that had locked up a merger 
without a fiduciary-out clause; therefore, the Court of Chancery contended that there was no 
reason for the court to grant an injunction unless a better offer emerges.  As the Court of 
Chancery conceded that such a merger agreement, followed quickly by consents, no doubt 
discouraged other suitors, the court lacked a response to its own argument.  Id. at *34 n.53. 
 259.  C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). 
 260.  The two bases for distinguishing Orman from Omnicare were first, that the board 
in Orman retained a fiduciary out, id. at *13 n.42, and second, the unaffiliated shares had 
veto power over the deal.  Id. at *33 n.92.  These two facts, however, convey an incomplete 
picture because the shareholders who owned thirty-six percent of the stock agreed to vote 
for the deal and against any alternative transaction for eighteen months.  As the Court of 
Chancery recognized, “It was this deal or nothing, at least for that [eighteen month] period 
of time.”  Id. at *36 & n.99. 
 261.  638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) [Kahn I], aff’d on reh’g, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) 
[Kahn II]. 
 262.  See supra text accompanying note 165. 
 263.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1111. 
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terms of the merger, making false disclosures, and paying an unfair price.
264
  
While the Court of Chancery held that Alcatel was a controlling 
shareholder,
265
 and, as such, owed fiduciary duties to Lynch and its 
shareholders, the court concluded that Alcatel had not breached those 
duties.
266
  The Delaware Supreme Court agreed that Alcatel was a 
controlling shareholder,
267
 but held that the Court of Chancery had erred in 
ruling that plaintiff bore the burden to prove that the merger transaction 
was unfair; instead, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the burden of 
proving the entire fairness of the merger remained with Alcatel because the 
independent committee of directors had been unable to act independently in 
light of Alcatel’s coercive behavior.
268
  As such, the Delaware Supreme 
Court remanded to the Court of Chancery for proceedings in accordance 
with its opinion.
269
  Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I held 
that its concerns about the innate power of controlling shareholders would 
require the standard of review in any controlling-shareholder merger to 
remain entire fairness, with the burden shifting to the plaintiff to prove 
unfairness if a committee proves it acted independently and effectively 
represented the minority shares.
270
  On remand, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery held that the merger was entirely fair.
271
  On the second appeal, 
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s holding that 
Alcatel satisfied the requirements for entire fairness.
272
 
 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., C.A. No. 8748, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at 
*6–9 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993).  Alcatel owned 43.3% of Lynch.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1114. 
 266.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151.  The chancery court 
specifically rejected plaintiff’s claim that Alcatel had made insufficient disclosure.  Id. at 
*22.  The Court of Chancery also held that the independent committee had been able to 
negotiate at arm’s length with Alcatel.  Id. at *13. 
 267.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112, 1114. 
 268.  Id. at 1112. 
 269.  Id. at 1121–22. 
 270.  Id. at 1117. 
 271.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., C.A. No. 8748, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at *6 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995); see also Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 83 (recounting the Court of 
Chancery’s finding that the merger was entirely fair). 
 272.  Id.  In Kahn II, the Delaware Supreme Court ticked off, seriatim, each of 
Weinberger’s elements to explain why this transaction, although the product of a coerced 
committee, nevertheless was entirely fair.  In essence, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn 
II reasoned that, “[w]here other economic forces are at work and more likely produced the 
decision to sell, as the Court of Chancery determined here, the specter of coercion may not 
be deemed material with respect to the transaction as a whole, and will not prevent a finding 
of entire fairness.”  Id. at 86.  Turning to the fair price issue, the Delaware Supreme Court 
deferred to the Court of Chancery’s analysis as to why Alcatel had offered a fair price.  Id. 
at 87–88.  Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s claim that Alcatel 
violated its duty of disclosure by omitting to state that it used coercion to get the Lynch 
board to agree to the merger price.  Id. at 89.  The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed prior 
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In Kahn I, the Delaware Supreme Court had two chances to defer to 
independent directors—once, in analyzing the conduct of Lynch’s 
committee, and a second time, in selecting the standard of review—and 
rejected both opportunities.  Focusing first on the composition of Lynch’s 
committee, both the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery 
agreed that the committee consisted of three independent directors
273
 and 
was well-advised by a prominent law firm, a financial advisor, and an 
investment bank.
274
  The point of dispute between the two courts was 
whether Lynch’s special committee had real bargaining power.  As the 
Delaware Supreme Court explained:  “[T]he performance of the 
Independent Committee merits careful judicial scrutiny to determine 
whether Alcatel’s demonstrated pattern of domination was effectively 
neutralized so that “each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its 
bargaining power against the other at arm’s length.”
275
 
The Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the committee had met this 
test and negotiated effectively was based on two facts.  First, the committee 
rejected Alcatel’s proposed deal between Lynch and Celwave Systems, 
Inc., a corporation owned by Alcatel.
276
  Second, when Alcatel withdrew 
the Celwave proposal and offered to acquire the fifty-seven percent of 
 
case law that held that defendants need not confess to wrongdoing to avoid a claim that they 
omitted material facts.  Id. at 89 (citing to Weiss v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8811, 
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989), aff’d, 574 A.2d 264 (Del. 1990)).  
Instead, the court held there was no material omission in the proxy materials because “[a] 
reasonable minority shareholder of Lynch was under no illusions concerning the leverage 
available to Alcatel and its willingness to use it to acquire the minority interest.”  Kahn II, 
669 A.2d at 89.  The court’s holding that there was no disclosure violation was significant, 
as it “precludes the award of damages per se, bears directly upon the manner in which 
stockholder approval was obtained, and places this case in the category of ‘nonfraudulent 
transactions’ in which price may be the preponderant consideration. . . . Although the 
merger was not conditioned on a majority of the minority vote, we note that more than 94 
percent of the shares were tendered In response to Alcatel’s offer.”  Id.  As such, the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn II rejected plaintiff’s contention that coercion of the 
independent committee was either a per se breach of fiduciary duty or required the 
conclusion that the merger was not entirely fair.  Id. 
 273.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113 (noting that Alcatel dealt with Lynch’s independent 
committee); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., C.A. No. 8748, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102, at *1 
n.1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1989). 
 274.  Lynch’s special committee received legal advice from the New York law firm, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and retained Thomson McKinnon Securities, 
Inc., as its financial advisor as well as Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., as its investment banker. 
Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113. 
 275.  Id. at 1118 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)). 
 276.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112-13.  Alcatel proposed a combination of Lynch and 
Celwave and made clear that Alcatel would not consider any other deal until Lynch first 
considered merging with Celwave. 
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Lynch’s shares that Alcatel did not already own,
277
 the committee then 
rejected three bids from Alcatel and ultimately accepted Alcatel’s fourth 
offer.
278
  While Alcatel accompanied its fourth offer with a threat to engage 
in a hostile tender offer if the merger agreement did not eventuate,
279
 the 
Court of Chancery reasoned that the committee was informed and 
aggressive, and under no compulsion to reach an agreement.
280
  The Court 
of Chancery contended that the committee reached its decision after it was 
advised that the price was fair and there were no other alternatives, given 
that Alcatel, as the controlling shareholder, could block any alternative 
transaction.
281
 
In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I drew the opposite 
inference from these facts.  While the Delaware Court of Chancery thought 
Lynch’s rejection of the proposed merger with Celwave indicative of the 
committee’s independence, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that 
Lynch’s concession to Alcatel’s demand that Lynch consider a merger with 
Celwave before considering any other merger partner made “the 
Independent Committee’s ability to bargain at arm’s length with Alcatel 
suspect from the outset.”
282
  The committee’s ultimate rejection of the 
proposed deal with Celwave—a company owned by Alcatel—did not 
change the Delaware Supreme Court’s view that the committee’s 
consideration of the deal demonstrated that the committee was 
compromised.  Second, unlike the Court of Chancery, the Delaware 
Supreme Court also believed that Alcatel’s threat of a tender offer, if Lynch 
did not agree to the merger terms, undermined the committee:  The record 
reflects that the ability of the Committee effectively to negotiate at arm’s 
length was compromised by Alcatel’s threats to proceed with a hostile 
tender offer if the $15.50 price was not approved by the Committee and the 
Lynch board.  The fact that the Independent Committee rejected three 
initial offers, which were well below the Independent Committee’s 
estimated valuation for Lynch and were not combined with an explicit 
threat that Alcatel was “ready to proceed” with a hostile bid, cannot alter 
the conclusion that any semblance of arm’s length bargaining ended when 
the Independent Committee surrendered to the ultimatum that accompanied 
 
 277.  Id. at 1113-14. 
 278.  Id. at 1113. 
 279.  Id. at 1119. 
 280.  Id.. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. at 1118.  At the August 1, 1986 Lynch board meeting, Alcatel representatives 
on Lynch’s board made clear that they opposed consideration of a proposed Lynch-Telco 
merger before consideration of a Lynch-Celwave combination.  Id. at 1112.  At the 
conclusion of this same meeting, the Lynch board established an independent committee to 
negotiate with Celwave.  Id. at 1113. 
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Alcatel’s final offer.
283
  Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to defer 
to this independent committee. 
Although claiming that the committee’s conduct did not meet the 
court’s standards for effective negotiations, the Delaware Supreme Court 
actually never gave this committee a chance.  From the court’s own 
statement of facts, Lynch’s full board agreed to consider the Celwave 
merger and then appointed a committee to consider this proposed deal.
284
  
Thus, like any board committee, this one had no choice but to follow the 
orders of its board,
285
 and Lynch’s board tasked its committee to consider a 
merger with Celwave.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s contention, 
therefore, that the committee’s consideration of the Celwave merger—a 
decision that the board, rather than the committee, made—instead of the 
committee’s rejection of the merger, was dispositive, was a fact outside of 
the committee’s control.  Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court believed 
that Alcatel’s threat of a hostile offer that accompanied its fourth offer, 
rather than the committee’s rejection of three offers from Alcatel before 
agreeing to the final offer, evidenced that the committee was compromised.  
The committee, however, could not prevent Alcatel from threatening to 
make a hostile offer.  Therefore, the only relevant issue was evaluating the 
committee’s reaction to Alcatel’s threat:  Did the committee’s decision to 
accept Alcatel’s fourth offer evidence surrender to this threat, or instead 
reflect a business judgment that, although this threat was insubstantial, as a 
tender offer would likely face serious difficulties with the fifty-seven 
percent of shares not owned by Alcatel if Lynch’s board recommended 
rejecting Alcatel’s offer,
286
 the committee thought it had reached the limits 
of its negotiations.  Traditionally, Delaware courts would punt on this call, 
 
 283.  Id. at 1121 (citation omitted).  For a case with similar facts that reached a contrary 
view see In re Siliconix, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at 
*3-4 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (reasoning that a controlling shareholder two-step freezeout is 
not inherently coercive, despite controlling shareholder resorting to a no-premium exchange 
offer, after failing to strike a deal with independent committee of directors). 
 284.  See supra note 282 (explaining that the Lynch board established an independent 
committee to negotiate with Celwave). 
 285.  The board can delegate most management functions to a board committee.  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2) (2007) (detailing the formation and powers of a 
board committee under Delaware corporate law); see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE 
A FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 
410[B] (3d ed. 2011).  The Lynch board created an independent committee and delegated to 
it the power to negotiate with Celwave on behalf of Lynch.  See Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113 
(detailing the formation of the Lynch independent committee).  As such, the committee was 
required to follow the instructions of the board. 
 286.  Alcatel owned only 43.3% of Lynch’s outstanding stock, although it had some 
additional clout by virtue of a provision in Lynch’s charter that required 80% share approval 
for any business combination.  Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113. 
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deferring to the decision of an independent and well-informed committee. 
Since both facts on which the Delaware Supreme Court relied were 
completely out of the committee’s control, this committee could not win.  
Once the committee received orders from its board of directors to consider 
the Celwave merger, and once Alcatel uttered the words that it would 
consider resorting to a hostile tender offer, this committee could no longer 
prove its independence to the Delaware Supreme Court.  Thus, no 
deference was possible, as the court based its decision not on the 
committee’s conduct, but on what others did and said. 
Given that case law states that courts will defer to independent 
committees who have demonstrated real negotiating power, and given that 
the court did not give this committee any chance to earn that deference, one 
suspects that the court’s real concern was the power of a controlling 
shareholder to undermine the process in a controlling-shareholder 
transaction.  The Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I, however, had the 
opportunity to incorporate these concerns into its standard of review, and 
did, in fact, seize that opportunity, by holding that entire fairness will 
remain the standard of review in any controlling-shareholder merger.
287
  
Therefore, by keeping the monitor as entire fairness, the court already 
anointed itself the ultimate arbiter of whether a controlling-shareholder 
merger is entirely fair.  As such, the court could have deferred to this 
independent and well-informed committee and shifted the burden to 
plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair, while still retaining the 
power to scrutinize the conduct of this controlling shareholder. 
Similarly, the court could have deferred to Lynch’s shareholders.  It is 
noteworthy that ninety-four percent of Lynch’s disinterested shares 
tendered their stock to Alcatel in its two-step tender offer/merger offer.
288
  
While technically not voting, shareholders in a tender offer are choosing to 
express their “vote” by selling their shares.
289
  Although the court in Kahn I 
did not mention this shareholder support for the Alcatel transaction, the 
 
 287.  Id. at 1116 (“Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in 
examining an interested merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains upon or 
is shifted away from the controlling or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging 
nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction requires careful scrutiny.”).  Prior to Kahn I, 
the issue was open about whether a successful independent committee would shift the 
standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule.  Id. at 1115 (noting 
that the lower court had identified different views on whether approval by an independent 
committee would change the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment 
rule). 
 288.  Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 89. 
 289.  See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(viewing shareholders’ selling of their stock akin to voting for purposes of establishing 
criteria for a controlling-shareholder tender offer to avoid being classified as coercive). 
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court in Kahn II used this support as one factor in ultimately holding that 
the merger was entirely fair.
290
 
As with Omnicare,
291
 the “market” of cases has deemed Kahn’s choice 
of the entire fairness standard wrong.  As discussed above,
292
 cases like In 
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
293
 and In re CNX Gas 
Corp. Shareholders Litigation
294
 have attempted to change the standard of 
review in controlling-shareholder freezeout transactions from entire 
fairness to the business judgment rule by identifying conditions under 
which courts can comfortably defer to the director and shareholder 
monitors.
295
  It is particularly important to underscore that the Court of 
Chancery agrees with the Delaware Supreme Court about the capacity of a 
controlling shareholder to overreach;
296
 their disagreement with the logic of 
Kahn is purely based on their faith in the external monitors.  For example, 
 
 290.  Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 89; see also supra note 272 (discussing other factors 
supporting the court’s holding). 
 291.  See supra notes 255–60 and accompanying text. 
 292.  See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 293.  808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (finding that in the context of a voluntary tender or 
exchange offer, Delaware law does not recognize the ability of shareholders to receive a 
particular price, and therefore, entire fairness is not the standard of review; the touchstone is 
the presence of “voluntariness,” to which that court looks at factors such as (1) whether 
coercion is present or (2) whether materially false or misleading disclosures were made to 
shareholders in connection with the offer; if the court finds the offer voluntary, then the 
controlling shareholder does not have a duty to prove the entire fairness of the transaction, 
and the court will defer to the board of directors as required under the business judgment 
rule). 
 294.  4 A.3d 397, 412 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that the business judgment rule should 
apply to freeze-out transactions that mirror the elements of an arm’s length merger); see In 
re CNX Gas. Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5377-VCL, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. 
Ch. July 5, 2010) (finding that the Court of Chancery’s application of the business judgment 
rule raised a sufficient conflict within Delaware case law that was appropriate for review by 
the Supreme Court), certifying questions to 30 A.3d 782 (Del. 2010). 
 295.  Other Delaware cases have similarly sought to distance themselves from the 
holding in Kahn by differentiating the facts based on the role of the controlling shareholder.  
See, e.g., In re John Q Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (distinguishing from Kahn because an unrelated 
third party, rather than controlling shareholder, made the offer to minority stockholders); see 
also Allen et al., supra note 2, at 1307–08 (recognizing that while there may be legitimate 
hesitancy in changing the standard of review based on the approval of an independent 
committee of directors, there is no basis for such hesitancy if there is a fully informed and 
uncoerced vote by disinterested shares). 
 296.  In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444 (noting that the “preferable policy choice” is to 
provide flexibility while recognizing the “inherent coercion” in controlling-shareholder 
transactions); In re CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 415 (agreeing that a controlling shareholder 
has the ability to overreach, and characterizing such power as “the ability to use its voting 
power to remove and replace incumbent directors and, if it wishes, force through its chosen 
transaction via [a] merger”). 
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the Court of Chancery in Pure Resources directly highlighted the 
inconsistency of Kahn’s view that independent directors could be so 
intimidated, which is “premised on a less trusting view of independent 
directors than is reflected in the important case of Aronson v. Lewis . . . 
which presumed that a majority of independent directors can impartially 
decide whether to sue a controlling stockholder.”
297
  Similarly, in CNX, the 
Court of Chancery summarized other Delaware Court of Chancery cases 
that have greater faith in the monitors than does Kahn:  “It bears noting that 
the Injunction Decision, Cox Communications, and the Pure Resources line 
of cases implicitly conflict with Lynch by holding that a combination of 
protective devices can compensate sufficiently for inherent coercion so as 
to alter the standard of review.”
298
  Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the 
efficacy of the external monitors, the Court of Chancery in CNX cited 
numerous examples of independent committees and disinterested shares 
that had the backbone to rebuff a controlling-shareholder transaction and 
concluded: 
Post-Lynch experience shows that special committees can 
negotiate effectively with controllers and that both special 
committees and minority stockholders can reject squeeze-out 
proposals . . . . These examples augur in favor of a unified 
standard under which independent directors and unaffiliated 
stockholders are given the tools to negotiate with controllers, 
backstopped by meaningful judicial review for fairness when 
those tools are withheld.
299
 
Thus, these Court of Chancery opinions agree with the concerns articulated 
 
 297.  In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 436 n.17. 
 298.  In re CNX Gas Corp., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *26–27. 
 299.  In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d at 413–14 (emphasis added).  The 
court described the specific examples:   
I am currently presiding over a challenge to a controlling transaction in which 
the majority-of-the-minority tender condition failed twice.  See Revlon, 990 
A.2d at 957.  Last fall the directors of iBasis adopted a rights plan in response to 
a tender offer by its controlling stockholder, Royal KPN.  The iBasis directors 
filed two lawsuits against Royal KPN, took one of the lawsuits through trial, 
and ultimately extracted a price increase from $2.25 to $3 per share.  In 2005, 
minority stockholders at Cablevision Systems Corporation rejected a going 
private transaction proposed by the Dolan family, which controlled 74% of the 
company’s voting power, despite its 51% premium over market.  In 2003, the 
outside directors of Next Level Communications, Inc. resisted a Siliconix tender 
offer and filed suit against the controlling stockholder to enjoin the transaction.  
Next Level, 834 A.2d at 846-47.  In Siliconix itself, the exchange offer that was 
the subject of the decision ultimately failed to satisfy its majority-of-the-
minority condition.   
Id. at 413. 
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in Kahn I that the controlling shareholder can overreach, but do not agree 
with the view in Kahn I that judges, rather than fully-functioning external 
monitors, are the best arbiter.  As the court in In re CNX Gas Corporation 
contended, Kahn “de-emphasized market forces . . . and relies heavily on 
judicial review.”
300
 
In sum, these outlier cases are interesting because the court in each 
case suspended its traditional reliance on the external monitors.  As such, 
adding the external monitors to the analysis does more than present a 
different view of whether the Omnicare board breached its fiduciary duties, 
or who should have had the burden of proof in Kahn, and what should be 
the standard of review in a controlling-shareholder merger; the monitors 
also provide objective facts on which to ground a decision.  As Omnicare 
and Kahn illustrate, when courts disregard the external monitors, judges 
delegitimize their opinions by pinning their decisions on inferences and 
suspect economics. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has exposed that while judges say that they will defer to 
the board only under the business judgment rule, such deference is quite 
widespread in other tests as well.  Delaware courts have worked hard to 
develop the contours of the external monitors so that courts can 
comfortably defer to an independent board or committee, disinterested 
share votes that are informed and not coerced, and a reliable market.  
Particularly when more than one fully-functioning monitor is active, these 
monitors present a formidable reason for courts not to intervene.  
Moreover, even though judges from the Delaware Court of Chancery agree 
that a controlling shareholder has the capacity to overreach, they have 
attempted to change the standard of review in controlling-shareholder cases 
to further rely on these monitors.  The courts’ strong support for fully-
functioning monitors is invaluable information for transactional and 
litigation lawyers.  This information is, however, also useful to judges, who 
can supplant otherwise intellectually-shaky decisions based solely on their 
own instincts, with strong grounding based on information derived from the 
external monitors. 
 
 300.  In re CNX Gas Corp., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *42. 
